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 The role of Latin America in U.S. foreign policy has ebbed and flowed for over 
100 years.  Over the last 15 years, the relationship between the United States and Latin 
America has seen a precipitous drop in both cooperation and cordiality.  The amicable 
relationships that the United States once enjoyed with Brazil and Venezuela specifically 
have become acrimonious.  With the United States’ increased interest in completing a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement by January, relations with Brazil are vital.  
The United States’ continued dependence on imported petroleum from Venezuela and 
America’s concern over Venezuela’s growing relationship with Cuba make this country 
also important to U.S. foreign policy.   
 The thesis focuses on the United States’ ability to use its cultural influence (soft 
power) to positively effect U.S. relations with Brazil and Venezuela.  By analyzing past 
and present effects of U.S. cultural influence in these two countries, the U.S. can better 
understand and appreciate the influence it wields as the world’s only remaining super 
power.  This thesis finds that despite historic evidence, the U.S. has had and continues to 
have a propensity to use soft power influence tactically, diminishing the effectiveness of 
its innate power  and influence as being the global leader in military, economic, cultural, 
and technological matters.  Conversely, the U.S. attempts to use its hard power (military 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the implementation of the United States’ foreign policy 
towards neighboring Latin American countries, specifically Brazil and Venezuela.  Over 
a period of almost 70 years, the United States has experienced a closer yet all-too-
confusing relationship with its Latin American neighbors.  The relationship has ebbed 
and flowed based on world events, regional concerns, and specific U.S. domestic polices 
that may or may not have had direct repercussions within Latin America.  This thesis 
examines the foreign policy exercised by the United States within and toward Brazil and 
Venezuela, their different successes, effectiveness, and the longevity of the policies.  The 
thesis also attempts to take into account the international events that influence regional 
politics.  The analysis takes as its strategic point of departure the fact that the United 
States currently finds itself as the only global superpower in the world. 
The status of the United States as a world economic and cultural hegemon, in 
addition to its military preponderance, provides it with a wide range of mechanisms with 
which to influence other countries. Does a more indirect application of U.S. influence 
through cultural and diplomatic means have an impact on the success or failure of U.S. 
policies in Latin America?  Cultural and political ‘influence’ has certainly had an affect 
on the success of U.S. policies in the past, it does in the present, and it certainly could in 
the future.  The hypothesis that this thesis proposes is that the United States is currently 
overemphasizing its military and economic power, thereby only reinforcing deep-rooted 
negative attitudes about itself.  These attitudes are reflected in the sentiment among many 
Latin Americans that the United States’ only national interest is its own economic 
advancement.  The thesis also argues that its cultural influence (soft power) vice its 
economic or military might (hard power), is a more effective means of improving popular 
and longer-term attitudes in Latin America towards the United States.  
An improvement in Latin Americans’ attitudes at the grassroots level through soft 
power application allows the Latin American leaders to more easily negotiate agreements 
with the United States.  The primary method for accomplishing this would be by 
increasing the win-set of potential acceptable outcomes for their constituents.  This 
2 
increase in the win-set in turn would lead to new opportunities for cooperation. The 
change in policy practice methodology by the United States will lead to a greater number 
of potential solutions in the two-level foreign policy game1 for Latin American leaders 
and thereby improve the environment for ensuring long term U.S. interests. 
A. COUNTRY BACKGROUNDS 
The United States finds itself at a very interesting point in world history.  At the 
beginning of the 21st century, contemporary reports, periodicals, publications, and books 
constantly refer to the United States as ‘an empire’.2  These sources range from Foreign 
Affairs and International Affairs, to the Journal of European Economic History and the 
Journal of Peace Research.  The United States’ economic, social, cultural, commercial, 
technological, and military power are unmatched as any this globe has ever seen in over a 
millennium.  It could even be argued that not since the Roman Empire has one nation 
been so dominant over its next closest global competitor.  What can be unique unto the 
United States is how it chooses to use its disproportionate power advantage.3  The 
choices it makes on the uses of its enormous strength and influential differential, may 
determine whether the United States remains a global leader for the next five years or the 
next 500 years. 
This thesis will examine the choices the United States has made in the usage and 
application of its hard power and soft power toward Latin America, specifically Brazil 
and Venezuela.  Latin America, as a region, makes an excellent laboratory for examining 
U.S. choices for several reasons.   Latin America is an area of the world were the United 
States’ power advantage over potential rivals has long been disproportionate and a region 
of the world where there are numerous examples of U.S. applications of both hard and 
soft power used to achieve specific interests. Additionally, Brazil and Venezuela make 
                                                 
1 The ‘two-level game’ is a reference to Robert Putnam’s (1988) theory.  The theory simply states that 
negotiations at an international level must be simultaneous carried out at two levels.  One level of 
negotiations occurs among the national actors while another, parallel, set of negotiations occurs between 
the state’s negotiators and its various applicable domestic constituents. 
2 Joffe, J. (2000, Summer). Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big?  The National Interest, 43. 
3 There are some theorists who would argue that superpowers are not at liberty to be able to ‘choose’ 
the type of course or action in which to exercise its foreign policy.  The assumption is that as a superpower, 
the nation or country is forced to act as a superpower and is therefore predisposed to act in the manner in 
which its role on the world stage is viewed.  This author is not attempting to argue the merits or weaknesses 
of this particular theory.  This section of the thesis is merely making a general statement as to the potential 
or possibility of taking another course of action for the sake of this analytical discussion. 
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excellent case studies based on the political and economic history they have with the U.S. 
In addition to the historical aspect, these countries share current issues of national and 
international political and economic significance. 
1. Brazil 
Brazil has been specifically chosen based on several factors.  One obvious factor 
is Brazil’s sheer size and relatively close proximity to the United States.4  Another factor 
making Brazil an interesting case study is the long history shared between the United 
States and Brazil, since Brazil declared its independence in 1822.  In fact, the United 
States was the first country to officially recognize Brazil’s independence from Portugal.  
Since that time, the two have had a long and intertwined history.  Arguably the most 
current factor making Brazil keenly important to the United States is that Brazil 
represents a very large economic trading bloc.  Not only is Brazil a large trading factor in 
its own right, but is also the clear and indisputable leader of Mercosur.5  
Brazil is important to the United States in specific regard to the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) agreement. Brazil is important on several levels.  The first level 
of importance is based on the fact that Brazil is the Co-Chairman with the United States 
in negotiations over the FTAA agreement, scheduled to be concluded by January 2005.  
On a separate but strictly national level, Brazil, and therefore the FTAA, represents what 
could be a very large economic boom for the U.S. economy.  On a regional level, Brazil’s 
GDP is the largest in Latin America (to include Mexico).  In fact, Brazil’s GDP makes up 
over one-third of the entire GDP of Latin America.6  Globally, issues discussed with the 
U.S. in the context of FTAA have ramifications in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
The FTAA could definitely assist the United States’ economic situation.  What the U.S. 
needs to do is ensure its approach toward Brazil is appropriate and effective.   
                                                 
4 It should be noted that despite Brazil’s relative size, almost that of the contiguous United States, a 
very large proportion of that area is consumed by the Amazon jungle.  This portion of Brazil is very 
sparsely populated, leaving the majority of the population along the coast. 
5 Mercosur is the economic and commercial trading block countries of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay. 
6 WIKIPEDIA: The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page.  Last accessed 
November 09, 2004.  
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2. Venezuela 
Venezuela is also important to the United States concerning multiple issues.  The 
most obvious issue involving Venezuela and the United States is oil.  Venezuela currently 
represents the second largest oil reserve in the world and is the third or fourth largest oil 
supplier to the U.S.7  Any disruption to the Venezuelan oil supply, as demonstrated 
during Venezuela’s 2002 strikes and subsequent coup attempt, would have a crippling 
effect on the U.S. economy.  The importance of Venezuelan oil is made even more 
poignant in light of the difficulties in the Middle East, specifically Iraq.     
Another issue underpinning Venezuela’s importance and impact on the United 
States’ political landscape is its relationship with Cuba.  Because Venezuela is the longest 
consistently running democracy in South America, its relationship with Cuba makes 
many U.S. policymakers all the more concerned.  Venezuela’s long, predominantly 
peaceful, and resilient history with the U.S. makes the rapidity and familiarity of its 
relations with Cuba even more disturbing.  While Venezuela in and of itself may not 
appear to be very significant to the U.S. as a single country, its petroleum reserves and 
cursory political ties to countries such as Cuba could have devastating and long term 
repercussions. 
B. DEFINING HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER 
As the author Joseph Nye originally argued over 10 years ago, power can be 
viewed and discussed in terms of either behavioral or resource power. 8  Nye defined 
Resource Power as the possession of resources associated with the ability to reach 
outcomes you want.  These resources providing this type of power come in many 
different forms, including the type, size, or fashion of populations, territory, agricultural, 
or mineral resources.9  The United States has an abundance of most if not all of these 
‘resource powers’ available to it. 
                                                 
7 Energy Information Administration (2004, April). United States of America: Country Analysis. 
Retrieved from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/usa.html, last accessed November 10, 2004. 
8 Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. Jr. (1998, Sept./Oct.). Power and Interdependence in the Information 
Age. Foreign Affairs, 77, 5, 81. 
9 Ibid., pp 83. 
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Behavioral Power is a theoretical power that can be further delineated into Hard 
Power and Soft Power.10  It is these two types of power that this thesis addresses and 
how the United States should look at its foreign policy options in Latin America.  Hard 
power is described as the ability to get others to do what they would not do otherwise 
through threats, rewards, or whether it was done through “economic carrots or military 
sticks.”11  Hard power is not strictly a reference to a country’s military capability, 
however.  Hard power is anything that has the ability to change another entity’s original 
venue through exerting, cajoling, enticing, or coercing.  Under this premise, even certain 
types of economic aid could therefore be classified as hard power under certain 
specifications, conditions, or contingencies.  Soft power is the ability to get desired 
outcomes because others want what you want.  Proper use and application of soft power 
is the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion.  Through the use of 
soft power, one is able to convince others to follow or agree to norms producing desired 
behavior from the entity that is applying the said soft power: “It (Soft power) co-opts 
people rather than coerces them.”12 
Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or culture, particularly if a state 
or organization can make its own power appear legitimate in the eyes of others.  Ideally, a 
particular nation or institution will try to establish international standards that encourage 
other nations or people to define their own interests in compatible ways.  If that is done 
successfully, then that state or organization will not need to expend as many costly 
traditional hard power resources (economic or military) as would otherwise be necessary 
in attempting to effectively influence its targeted object or audience.  Soft power can vary 
over time, over different domains, as well as from culture to culture.  The subtle yet 
successful spread of American13 popular culture (American products, technology, food, 
music, fashion, movies, etc.)  has  generally  increased global awareness of and openness  
                                                 
10 Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. Jr. (1998, Sept./Oct.). Power and Interdependence in the Information 
Age. Foreign Affairs, pp 82. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Nye, J. S. Jr. (2002/2003, Winter). Limits of American Power. Political Science Quarterly, 117, 4, 
548. 
13 ‘America’ or ‘American’ will be used interchangeably to mean the United States of America unless 
otherwise specifically delineated. 
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toward American ideas and values.  America’s soft power influence has not been so 
much an intentional goal as an inadvertent byproduct of its cultural and economic 
success.   
It is important to note that soft power must be credible to be effective.  Media 
influence in the venue of lending publicity and credibility can aid in providing and 
developing a country’s or organization’s soft power.  CNN provided a perfect example of 
this after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and, intentionally or not, helped 
shape the world’s opinion of the invasion.  This assertion is based on two assumptions.  
The first assumption is that CNN operates as an American organization and the second is 
that CNN is truly global in its effectiveness and reach.  Based on these assumptions, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was interpreted and reported world wide as a blatant and 
unprovoked attack on another country’s legitimate sovereignty.  CNN was the only news 
organization at the time with the reach to provide global penetration of the world viewing 
audience.14   
If the global news station had been Al Jazeera the strike into Kuwait may have 
been interpreted and reported totally different.  Theoretically, Al Jazeera could have 
reported Iraq’s incursion into Kuwait as nothing more than Iraq carrying out a long 
overdue colonial correction when Kuwait was unjustifiably taken from Iraq and illegally 
given its independence by the old British Empire.15  Perhaps fortunately for the United 
States, Al Jazeera was not in existence during the initial Gulf War.16  The credibility of, 
and soft power exerted by, CNN made the subsequent invasion of Iraq by a United 
Nations (UN) coalition in 1991 seem completely justifiable almost world wide.  Contrast 
this CNN influence to the extent and influence of Al Jazeera after only eight years in 
existence.  Based on the current U.S. led coalition’s assault in Iraq and the view being 
portrayed through Al Jazeera today and one can see this influence in action. What this 
paper concentrates on is how the United States misuses its hard power and how it can 
                                                 
14 While the BBC provides worldwide viewership as well, it is also Western based and therefore 
Western-biased in its general views. 
15 Keohane, pp 83. 
16 Al Jazeera was established in 1996 with a $150 million grant from the emir of Qatar, where the 
broadcasting company is still based.  Its viewership rivals that of the BBC and is one of the, if not ‘the’, 
most watched news organization in the Middle East.   
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more effectively apply its soft power.  Again, the goal of the United States is to influence 
Latin America through the ability to co-opt versus coerce. 
C. BASIC PREMISE 
Early after World War II in the fight against communism, the newly created CIA 
began funding ‘cultural diplomacy’.  The term is loosely intended to convey 
organizational attempts at influencing entire cultures.  The methods employed by the U.S. 
government and the CIA during and shortly after WWII would be woefully inappropriate 
by today’s standards and values.  The methods do however serve as a reminder of how 
serious Washington once took the ideological war against the Soviet Union and the 
promotion of democratic ideals, particularly in Latin America (in theory if not in 
practice).17  This chapter of United States’ foreign policy history should be reviewed and 
reassessed.  This author is not recommending using the CIA and covert operations to 
attempt the changing of minds of an entire hemisphere.  By reviewing the effectiveness 
of previous attempts at soft power applications though, important lessons can be 
extracted from this less-than-proud period of U.S history.  The United States needs to 
retake the role of leader in the dissemination of democratic ideals, values, culture, and 
ethics to the rest of the world.  How that influence can be accomplished most effectively 
is discussed in this thesis with specific reference to the case studies of U.S.-Brazil and 
U.S.–Venezuela relations.     
In the last 15 years alone, there have been huge strides in the development of 
telecommunications, Internet, and the cheap flow of information and ideas.  Soft power is 
therefore becoming a simpler, more compelling, and powerful means of power projection 
into other countries and cultures than ever before.  As the former U.S. ambassador to the 
UN once said, “Armed guards can keep people from crossing borders, but they cannot 
keep out ideas.18”    
There is a simple, sad, but poignant example of the power to co-opt and soft 
power’s ability to effectively influence at the very grass-roots level (and thereby 
                                                 
17 Finn, H. K. (2003, November/December). The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign 
Audiences. Foreign Affairs, 82, 6, 15. 
18 Max M. Kampelman, M. M. (2003, August 1). U.S. Presence Abroad: Power and Principle. Vital 
Speeches of the Day, 69, 20, 620.  Kampelman, Former Ambassador to the UN, delivered at the Center for 
the Study of the Presidency, Washington, D.C., June 13, 2003. 
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effectively influencing entire cultures).  The example is of just how many individuals are 
willing to become martyrs and suicide bombers for radical groups.  Based merely on the 
strength of a group’s ideas, cultural principles, or ideals, neither the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) nor Al Qaeda seem to be having much difficulty in recruiting people 
to die for their causes.  This type of recruitment is done through effective application of 
the organization’s soft power ideology and is thereby able to leverage a much greater 
scale of the global society despite each organizations relatively small size and operating 
budgets. 
Freedom House reports that currently there exists the largest percentage of the 
world population living under democracy or near-democracy than at any other time in 
human history – 63%.19 This large percentage indicates an opportunity, though fleeting, 
for the United States to have a truly globalizing effect if it so chooses.  The United States 
needs to take the lead in the distribution of its lofty democratic ideals and it should be 
starting with some of its closes neighbors and once strong allies, Brazil and Venezuela. 
D.  IMPORTANCE 
Over the last 15 years, the relationship between the United States and Latin 
America has seen a precipitous drop in both cooperation and cordiality.  Additionally, 
over the last several years the United States has seen a general but definitive left shift in 
Latin American politics.  The shift is represented in Brazil by the presidential election of 
Labor Union leader, President Lula de Silva.  Venezuelan politics has also demonstrated 
an analogous shift away from mainstream democracy when its citizens democratically 
elected a former coup leader and previous Army Lieutenant Colonel, President Hugo 
Chavez Frias.  This left shift tendency is corroborated by the most recent election of 
President Tabare Vazquez of Uruguay in October 2004.  President Vazquez is the first 
leftist leader to be elected president in Uruguay’s history.20  It appears that Latin 
America is currently in the midst of a regional political shift.  If the United States is to 
have any long term influence in the new political arena, it needs to consider other options 
than strictly hard power coercive practices.   
                                                 
19 Kampelman, pp 622. 
20 BBC News, UK Ed. Country Profile: Uruguay.  Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/1229360.stm, last accessed November 09, 
2004. 
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The situation between the United States and Venezuela specifically, has only 
worsened over the last two years.  When the recent presidential referendum vote was 
returned on President Chavez, despite the apparent lack of support on the part of the 
United States, the definitive majority of Venezuelans showed a confidence vote in favor 
of allowing Chavez to finish out his term in office.  Despite the accusations by anti-
Chavez groups, multiple international organizations ruled the referendum as being fair 
and accurate.  The cordial relationships that the United States previously enjoyed with 
both Brazil and Venezuela have become much less harmonious. 
With the United States’ increased interest in completing a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas agreement by January 2005 (with Brazil and the United States Co-Chairing the 
negotiations until the deadline) and the United States’ continued dependence on imported 
petroleum from Venezuela, the relations with these two specific countries become all the 
more important.  For the United States to successfully encourage a free trade regional 
agreement and ensure continued favorable relations with one of its main petroleum 
suppliers, it needs to rethink its political relationship and public diplomacy approach 
throughout the region.  How the United States chooses to approach these issues will 
determine whether its regional influence increases in order to help promote free trade and 
enhance democratic ideals or whether the U.S. approach only manages to increase 
regional tensions to the breaking point. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The case study method will be used to examine the effects of soft power 
application in Brazil and Venezuela.  The format to be used for the case studies will be 
the congruence procedure.21  The congruence procedure allows the author to compare 
hard and soft power applications and effectiveness (or acceptance) of U.S. policies at 
different time periods in each of the case studies.  In each set of circumstances, there are 
specific examples of hard power treatments being used.  The effectiveness of the hard 
power applications will be analyzed from different historical perspectives, polls, and 
sources, as well as other independent studies analyzing changes in attitudes and 
perceptions toward the U.S, past and present.   
                                                 
21 Stephen Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 58-63. 
10 
A wide variety of primary sources will be gathered for both case studies involving 
Brazil and Venezuela.  Some of these sources include interviews in Brazil and the United 
States, and recently declassified CIA and governmental documents.  Interviews have 
been conducted among a wide range of civilian, military, and governmental agencies 
from both Venezuela and Brazil.  To better isolate the effects of hard and soft power, 
there will also be extensive research of secondary sources concerning military operations, 
international events, past presidential policies, and economic coercion in the region on 
the part of the United States (all examples of hard power application).   
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this thesis will focus on Brazil.  In the early part of the relationship, 
Brazil was the only country in Latin America to send troops in support of U.S. and Allied 
Forces against the Axis powers in Europe.22  As late as 1965, Brazil even sent troops into 
the Dominican Republic as a show of support.  Since that time, the relationship has 
digressed to the point where the two countries are now in an acrimonious stalemate over 
a free trade agreement that could greatly increase the prosperity of both countries.  Why 
did Brazil decide to distance itself from the U.S. within a period of only a few years?  
Chapter II will help explain what caused a solid relationship between the U.S. and Brazil 
prior to WWII to change.   
This chapter will review and analyze U.S. – Brazilian relations from World War 
II to the present in three specific time segments.  The first time segment will focus from 
the late 1930s to 1964.  The research will review the U.S. foreign policy techniques used 
by the U.S. and trace changes in Brazilian attitudes toward the United States during this 
period.  The second period to be studied covers from 1965 to 1991.  In this period, the 
U.S. moved away from a predominantly soft power approach in favor of a more neutral 
and distant stance from Brazil specifically and Latin America in general.  The thesis will 
look at the effects of the Cold War and its policy implementation toward Brazil.  The 
final period is 1991 to the present.  During this period the thesis will address current and 
changing U.S. policies towards Brazil, the motivations, and the political relationships 
between the two countries.   
                                                 
22 While Brazil is currently heading a UN force in Haiti, its motivation is completely different now 
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Chapter III will be a case study on Venezuela.  The chapter will review the 
historic interactions between Venezuela and United States, but will predominantly focus 
on the period since the presidential election of President Hugo Chavez.  A large 
percentage of the research on this time period will focus on the increasingly close 
relationship, both personally and politically, between President Hugo Chavez and Cuban 
leader Fidel Castro.  There are currently thousands of Cuban doctors, teachers, aid 
workers, and ‘advisors’ in Venezuela.  Cuba’s ability to assert its own form of soft power 
through co-option of the Venezuelan public rather than through coercion may be having a 
greater affect on the hearts and minds of the Venezuelan public than most policy makers 
in Washington realize. 
  The current principal method of influence by the United States’ in Venezuela is 
through purchasing copious amounts of oil.  In this manner the United States provides the 
Venezuelan government with a large source of revenue.  This common method of 
influence may not be the most effective form of encouraging closer long-term relations 
with Venezuela.  Is Cuba’s current soft power application trumping the United States’ 
more traditional means of international influence?  The thesis will address this. 
Tracing the effectiveness of Cuba’s soft power application may demonstrate that 
despite the United States’ military and economic superiority and undisputed global 
hegemony, it may be soft power that is proving to be a much more effective means of 
influence.  The research will review and analyze the approaches the U.S. practiced in 
Venezuela and what effect it had on the Venezuelan elites as well as the general public.  
What affect if any did the different forms of influence (hard Vs soft power) have?  Also 
being considered in the Venezuelan case study is the relationship Venezuela had with 
Cuba before Cuban volunteers began entering the country a few years ago.  The author 
will examine links between soft power application and the changing attitudes of 
Venezuelans not just toward the United States, but also toward Cuba. 
The fourth and final chapter is a synthesis chapter as well as a conclusion.  The 
research on Brazil and Venezuela will be analyzed to look at U.S. foreign policy in the 
specific country and what affect those policies had on the countries and its relations with 
the U.S.  The thesis conclusion will then look at the two countries as a comparison to 
12 
ascertain the existence of any relationships between soft power application and 
improvements in Latin American attitudes toward the United States.  The research will 
analyze any similarities between the two case studies to better construct causal 
relationships and discuss conditional or intervening variables in either one.  Based on 
these comparative findings, the thesis will make recommendations to the State 
Department concerning methods in changing its political approach towards Brazil and 




Since Brazil’s independence from Portugal in 1822, the United States and Brazil 
have enjoyed relatively close relations.  The U.S. was the first country to recognize 
Brazil’s independence immediately following the announcement of its secession from 
Portugal.  The relationship, while not always completely amicable, has served both 
countries through difficult times in peace and war. 
This chapter will specifically look at U.S.–Brazilian relations within three specific 
time intervals and America’s use of hard and soft power as applicable in each.  The first 
time interval will be from the mid-1930s until 1964.  This period will look at the political 
and economic ties of these two countries from just prior to World War II until the end of 
Brazilian democratic rule in 1964.   
The second phase will focus on the period from 1965 until 1991.  The period will 
look at U.S.-Brazil relations in the context of and as a factor of the Cold War.  The time 
interval will also look at the economic and political transitions in Brazil and America’s 
role during that era.  The period analysis will conclude just after Brazil’s transition from 
its military dictatorship back to a democracy. 
The third and final interval discussed is from 1991 until the present.  This 
discussion concentrates on three specific factors: (1) U.S. tactics and relations with Brazil 
in the context of the United States becoming the only global superpower after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; (2) Brazil’s attempts at establishing itself as a regional 
hegemon in its own right, and; (3) the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
agreement and how U.S.-Brazil relations will affect the final outcome of such an all-
encompassing trade pact.   
All three time intervals cover important factors in both countries’ history.  The 
type of influence the U.S. used (hard power and soft power) had very profound and 
lasting  affects  on  both  countries  and  their  relationship.   All  aspects provide valuable  
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lessons for the United States to consider and upon which to reflect in the United States’ 
continuing struggle for increased influence and relations in Brazil specifically, and Latin 
America in general. 
B. BRAZIL: 1930S TO 1964 
The phrase best describing America’s attempted change in attitude toward Latin 
America during this period would be President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor 
Policy’.  It was formally introduced in March 1933 with great hope and anticipation for 
better relations with the leaders of Latin America.23  Despite the Good Neighbor Policy 
though, the years preceding WWII became an era of conflicting U.S. policies for the sake 
of national security.  With the war in Europe looming precariously close, U.S. national 
security took precedence over any attempt to establish simple, consistent, or 
straightforward political objectives in the specific countries of Latin America.  The 
primary U.S. objective in that region, contrary to the seemingly vacillating foreign 
policies at the time, was not so much to perpetuate democracy as it was to foster 
consistency and stability within the entire hemisphere for the purpose of increasing the 
security of the United States.  
In the early 1930s as the world was preparing for hostilities, Brazilian President 
Getulio Vargas skillfully played Germany’s interest against the United States’ interest for 
the economic benefit of Brazil.24 Many officials in the U.S. State Department at the time 
attempted to pass harsh sanctions against Brazil for its ‘double-dealing’ practices.  
Resisting increasing pressure from Congress to take hard power economic action against 
Brazil, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chose a more soft or conciliatory approach.  
He feared that applying hard power sanction might induce the resource-rich and 
strategically located nation to consider more cooperative tendencies towards the Axis 
powers.   
Brazil was finally forced to make a decision between Germany and the United 
States after Germany declared war on the United States and Great Britain on December 
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of State (1943). Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941. 
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 323-329. 
24 Gilderhus, M. T. (2000). The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889.  
Scholarly Resources Inc., 82. 
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11, 1941.25  As a partial result of Secretary of State Hull’s soft power or conciliatory 
approach toward Brazil, Brazil eventually sided with the United States despite the fact 
that an Allied victory was far from a forgone conclusion.26  
Between 1935 and 1947, the U.S. used multiple techniques in its attempts to 
influence Brazil and ensure the country’s continued cooperation during global hostilities.  
Some of these techniques included more traditional political channels such as financial 
inducements, discriminatory economic practices, and political ceremonial snubs.27  Each 
of these different techniques was an application of hard power.  This is based on the 
intent of the policies to force or coerce Brazil into acting in a particular direction or 
manner.  Conversely, the United States applied soft power in its generous agreement to 
provide Brazil funding for the construction of a vital steel mill.  The steel mill was 
intended to dramatically assist Brazil in its move toward its own industrial revolution.  It 
was soft power gestures such as these that aided the Brazilian government into justifying 
to the rest of the country why it continued to support the United States over Germany.   
The soft power gestures by the U.S. toward Brazil were having positive effects on 
the general Brazilian population.  The influence that the United States began wielding 
based on the assistance to Brazil in infrastructure development was greater than any 
probable ideological leanings or commonalities that may have existed between the two 
countries at the time.  Therefore, despite Brazil’s authoritarian run government and its 
desire to demonstrate a propensity for democracy merely for the sake of garnering closer 
ties with the U.S., it was not this that encouraged such closeness between the two 
countries.  It was the positive soft power effects of American social and cultural influence 
that convinced most Brazilians that closer ties with the U.S. would be a more beneficial 
endeavor.   
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United 
States enjoyed strong support from Brazil as well as the rest of Latin America.  The 
strong support could be more directly attributed to the general good will felt toward the 
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U.S. due to the cooption vice coercion than out of any real sympathy for the loss of 
American lives.  The popularity of the newly instituted Good Neighbor Policy more than 
marginally affected the positive attitude of Latin Americans.28  It is important to note 
that Brazil was so supportive of the U.S. and Allied forces that it was the only Latin 
American country to back the Allies directly with troops in European combat by having 
its military fighting in Italy.29 
Trade was another soft power approach used by the U.S. to help influence Brazil.  
The United States directly aided Brazil’s economic recovery after 1941 through 
enormously expanded mutual trade agreements.  With recommendations from the U.S. 
and assistance by the U.S., the Inter-American Coffee Agreement was ratified in April 
1941.  What this agreement did was attempt to prevent the devastating and destructive 
competitive practices among the hemisphere’s leading coffee producers trying to 
maximize the dwindling profits in a war torn global economy.  The U.S. promised Brazil 
specifically, an above-market price for its coffee and a larger share of the U.S. market.30  
Using a soft power approach to economic and political cooperation with Brazil, helped 
ensure Brazil’s continued cooperation with the U.S. 
In addition to overtly beneficial political practices executed for Brazil, the U.S. 
also extended more subtle examples of influence to ensure continued cooperation.  In 
July 1941, President Roosevelt established the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs (OCIAA) headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller.  The organization’s 
explicit purpose was to “provide for the development of commercial and cultural 
relations between the American Republics…”31 The precise intent was to formulate and 
execute programs in support of United States national defense by strengthening the 
relationships of the countries within the western hemisphere.  The methods necessary to 
accomplish some of these goals involved the use of subtle commercial and economic 
techniques.  Other mediums used to accomplish bilateral and regional cooption were the 
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arts and sciences, educational programs, travel opportunities, radio, press, and even 
cinema.  The Roosevelt administration truly believed that culture conscious intellectual 
and societal understanding would provide or lead to economic and political cooperation 
in Brazil.32  President Roosevelt felt strongly enough about the need to promote 
ideological and cultural persuasion that the initial budget of $3.5 million in 1941 for 
OCIAA was increased to $38 million just one year later.33  The years between the late 
1940s and the mid 1950s were full of origination and formalization of organizations and 
Acts in attempts to favorably influence Brazil and the rest of Latin America as to the 
goodness of the United States.  The new governmental agencies were developed in 
particular to combat the anti-American propaganda being conducted specifically by the 
Soviet Union in the region at the time.   
In 1948, the U.S. Congress enacted the Smith-Mundt Act to counter Soviet 
propaganda in an attempt to ‘sell’ America to the world.34  In 1950, President Truman 
directed Secretary of State Acheson to prepare a vigorous “Campaign of Truth” as a U.S. 
offensive in response to Communist ‘lies’.35  The Department of State established the 
International Information Administration (IIA) in 1952 in response to increasing concerns 
and threats in the area of psychological warfare.36  On July 31, 1953, President 
Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency (USIA) as a soft power foreign 
policy tool to be used in conjunction with hard power diplomatic, military, and economic 
policy.  “The primary purpose [of the USIA] was to persuade foreign people that it was in 
their own interest to follow the lead of the United States…”37  Between 1942 and 1946, 
Disney® produced over a dozen short cartoons widely distributed throughout the 
hemisphere with the explicit intent of improving U.S.-Brazilian relations through the use 
                                                 
32 Haines, G. K. (1977, Fall). Under the Eagle’s Wing: The Franklin Roosevelt Administration Forges 
an American Hemisphere. Diplomatic History, I, 378-379. 
33 Gilderhus, pp 104. 
34 Haines, G. K. (1989). The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the 
Third World, 1945-1954. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 160. 
35 U.S. Department of State (1948, November 28).  Helping the World to Know Us Better. Bulletin, 
19, 672. 
36 Haines, pp 161. 
37 Haines, pp 161. 
18 
of this soft power medium.38 The topics dealt with by the Disney® cartoons ranged from 
the archetypal concerning the ‘great’ Amazon and ‘wonderful’ South American life, to 
less traditional topics such as the importance of grain to the war effort and the importance 
of national defense against invasion.39  Even Hollywood supported the U.S. government 
in its attempts to ameliorate western hemisphere relations for the benefit of the U.S. war 
effort. 
To counter heavy communism propaganda, the U.S. also resorted to a more direct 
means of influencing Latin Americans and Brazilians.  Economically the United States, 
more broadly than just via coffee, opened itself to Latin America providing more direct 
assistance to its economic and cultural ‘development’.  Between 1933 and 1945 the 
United States signed 15 Latin American trade reciprocity agreements.  11 of these 15 
agreements were enacted before 1940.  One of the advantages was increased production 
and a better standard of living in Brazil.  In fairness, some of these agreements also 
served the important purpose of tying Latin America’s continued progress directly to the 
U.S.  This also ensured mutual cooperation with U.S. policies at a very critical time in 
world history.40  In this example of U.S. policies, both soft power and hard power were 
applied for a mutual gain by both parties. 
After WWII and Harry S. Truman’s entrance into the presidential office, the 
urgency and necessity of maintaining Brazil as a happy and loyal ally to win the war 
quickly diminished.  Much to the chagrin of Brazilians, they stopped getting the attention, 
funds, and recognition they felt they so deserved based on the country’s efforts, troop 
commitment, and full cooperation with the United States.  Not only did the United States 
refuse to provide any type of Marshall Plan for Latin America as Brazil had hoped, but 
Brazil was all but shut out of WWII peace negotiations.  Additionally, Brazil received no 
acknowledgement for its request for a permanent seat on the Security Council.  Once the 
war was won and the United States no longer needed Brazil for the survival of the United 
States, the assumption was that Brazil had become merely another tool to be used by the 
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39 Ibid. 
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United States.  Brazil like the rest of Latin America felt like mere instruments utilized to 
help the United States execute whatever political policy it wanted to complete.41 
What Brazil did get was a new war – the Cold War and the paranoia associated 
with the perceived threat of Communism.42  One of the more frustrating aspects of the 
new Cold War was mentioned by the Ambassador from Brazil, Joao Carlos Muniz, when 
he asked as to why would the United States use economic aid and assistance (soft power) 
to fight communism in Europe, but choose police and coercive tactics (hard power) in 
Latin America.43 
Starting in the late 1950s, Brazil quickly became frustrated with the United 
States’.  America’s changing attitude and approach toward Brazil after the war, its 
complete lack of support for Brazil’s request as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, and the increasing use of hard power in its dealings with Brazil, led Brazil to 
change its views and approach toward the U.S.  Under the leadership of President 
Kubitschek, Brazil began altering its international role in hemispheric politics.  Brazil’s 
foreign policy moved away from inter-dependence on the U.S. and focused more on 
expanded international cooperation and independence from the U.S.44  Instead of 
maintaining its traditional role as mediator between Latin America and the U.S., Brazil 
moved toward being the Latin American advocate, thereby putting it at direct odds with 
the United States in an ever-increasing quantity.45  
The United States saw Brazil’s precipitous move to the political left as a major 
concern over the apparently increasing influence of communism in its executive branch.  
It also provided an excellent excuse to take action against an increasingly difficult and 
uncooperative ‘partner’.  Under the nationalistic polices of Kubitschek, and then even 
more so under his successor President Janio Quadros, the United States became indirectly 
involved in the military coup of the democratically elected Brazilian government.   
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After only a few months in office, Brazil’s President, Janio Quadros, resigns and 
is democratically replaced in 1960 by Joao Goulart.  The rapid and tumultuous turn over 
of power to Quadros’ left-wing vice-president did nothing to alleviate the concerns of the 
U.S.  The degree of direct involvement by the United States in the subsequent overthrow 
of Brazil’s democratically elected President in 1964 is debatable.  The United States did 
however move multiple naval ships into a position off Brazil’s coast in case the military 
junta needed re-supplying of its offensive against its government.46  America’s unofficial 
offer of assistance to Brazil’s military and approval of its actions best represented in the 
minds of many Brazilians the hard power ‘reward’ Brazil received from the U.S. for 
years of Brazilian support during one of the United States’ most trying periods in its 
history. 
C. BRAZIL: 1965 TO 1991 
The second period to be addressed started with President Johnson becoming 
increasingly bogged down and distracted with Vietnam.  Vietnam became such a disaster 
for the Johnson administration that the president eventually announced in 1968 that he 
would not run for re-election.   
Concerning Brazil, President Johnson’s handling of the Alliance for Progress 
program reduced the progress and its execution down to a crawl.  Between the in-house 
fighting in the Johnson administration and the president’s requirement that all loans 
above $10 million required his direct approval, the program became counter productive.  
It had become so absurd in the implementation and interpretation of the rules that Brazil 
actually cancelled loans from the U.S. for badly needed fertilizer shortly before Brazil’s 
growing season.47   
In April 1967, President Johnson called for a meeting of American chiefs of state.  
His staff had finally impressed upon him the importance of Latin America and how the 
American president needed to at least acknowledge the region.  At this meeting in Punta 
del Este, President Johnson committed the U.S. through the Inter-American Development 
                                                 
46 Lowenthal, A. F., ed. (1991).  Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes 
and Issues.  Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 199. 
47 Levinson, J. and De Onis, J. (1972).  The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the 
Alliance for Progress. Chicago: A Twentieth Century Fund Study by Quadrangle Books, 117-119. 
21 
Bank and the Export-Import Bank.  Johnson also pledged strong support of the U.S. for a 
Latin American common market.  Despite Johnson’s hope for quick and successful 
market integration, Brazil dragged its feet on the proposal.  Brazil’s concern, as well as 
that of several other Latin America countries, was that the development of a common 
market left Latin America too vulnerable to U.S. corporations to come in and quickly 
dominate.48   
After the politically debilitating war in Vietnam forced President Johnson to 
refuse a re-election bid, a new era in U.S.–Brazilian relations was introduced.  The new 
era was ushered in under President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger’s tutelage.  President Nixon was a realist who believed that working toward an 
‘ideal’ Latin American policy was unrealistic and a waste of time and resources.   
What Nixon and his administration wanted was very similar to what the Johnson 
administration had privately worked toward (though Nixon and Kissinger were more 
vocal and upfront); predictability and stability.  The predictability the U.S. wanted was 
one where the government, regardless of type, would support U.S. policy in the region.  
The stability sought, meant that any government in place that supported U.S. policies 
would remain in place until its services were no longer needed.  At that point in the 
relationship, the U.S. would make the determination whether or not it wanted to continue 
its support through economic and military assistance or discontinue its relationship based 
on U.S. two-level game domestic politics.   In the case of Brazil, stability meant that the 
U.S. could count on the military leadership of Brazil for continued support of U.S. 
policies and how they chose to handle internal strife was up to them.49 The United States 
would maintain its over-arching policy of preferring economic stability over democratic 
consistency. 
Under President Carter, the United States’ rules changed and human rights 
became the primary focus.  Interestingly enough, while the rules in Brazil did change, 
hard power coercion remained the U.S tactic in the region though the approach shifted 
dramatically.  Under Johnson, military and economic aid was used to buy continued 
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support of Brazilian military leaders.  Under the Carter administration, the threat to 
withhold military and economic aid had the effect of alienating Brazil’s military leaders.  
In defiance to the Carter administration ‘meddling’ in Brazil’s human rights affairs, then-
President Ernesto Geisel cancelled a 25 year standing military aid program from the 
U.S.50  Despite President Carter’s persistent efforts, initially very little success in 
mitigating human right abuses seemed to take place in Brazil.  The United States’ relation 
with the military dictatorship continued to deteriorate during the remainder of President 
Carter’s term in office.  President Carter’s focus on human rights did however publicize a 
glaring deficiency in the political practice of Brazilian’s military rulers.  This negative 
publicity eventually encouraged and presumably hastened the return to a civilian 
democratic government.51 
A definitive philosophy shift occurred again during the Reagan administration.  
This shift in U.S. policy philosophy was best defined by President Reagan’s foreign 
policy advisor during his 1980 campaign and his Ambassador to the United Nations after 
election, Jean Jordan Kirkpatrick.  Ambassador Kirkpatrick brought to the Reagan 
administration a theory whereby she blamed the Carter administration for many of the 
failures in Latin America.  She stated that it was President Carter’s unwillingness to 
support dictators friendly to the U.S. that created such failures in his foreign relations 
efforts.  Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s belief was the United States should support U.S.-
friendly authoritarian governments regardless of their human rights records.  The United 
States should only oppose those regimes that demonstrated such a gross or nefarious 
tendency as to be put in the same category of totalitarians as Germany’s Hitler or 
Russian’s Stalin.52  This new political philosophy during the Reagan administration 
helped resolve many of the bitter feelings between the Brazilian military government and 
Washington.  The blatant return to the use and support of hard power by the Reagan 
administration, particularly during his first term in office, arguably extended the rule of 
the harsh Brazilian dictatorship.  The U.S. support of dictatorships only increased the 
hardship of the local people and thereby further solidified a generation’s view of anti-
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Americanism.  Not surprisingly, the majority of Brazilian’s became confused and 
bewildered at the United States’ tendency to flip-flop on policies from one administration 
to the next. 
Throughout President Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s, his focus did subtly shift 
to a more pro-democracy agenda rather than one of strictly anti-communism.  President 
Reagan initiated “Project Democracy” and the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED). Project Democracy’s principal objective was to counter the enormous amount of 
funds that the Soviet Union was applying toward pro-Marxism and Leninism propaganda 
through the increased use of the Soviet’s soft power capability.  The White House began 
in earnest in the early 1980s to again consider world-wide conferences and plans to 
spread the ‘gospel’ and the virtues of democracy.53  The initial purpose of NED was to 
provide a direct and complimentary role to spread the positive virtues of democracy over 
that of Leninism.  A close second, though not a primary role, was to assist in the direct 
development of democracy abroad.  In the final stages of Congressional funding 
approval, NED became the only program awarded funds due to the more bipartisan 
approach and perceived independent infrastructure of the program.54 So, while NED is 
funded by the U.S. State Department, it is more autonomous of political influence than 
most people realize.   
D. BRAZIL: 1992 TO 2004 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, The United States’ foreign policy focus 
drastically shifted.  Brazil was well on its way to consolidating the democracy that it had 
reestablished only seven years earlier.  The United States was able to shift its focus from 
targeting anti-communist organizations to goals more closely focusing on pro-democracy, 
if only so slightly.   
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One of the methods that the United States demonstrated a pro-democracy focus in 
civil society was through the use of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  The new 
focus on NGOs demonstrated a subtle shift in the use of soft power.  NGOs during the 
early nineties were viewed as being one of two distinct types.  The two distinct types 
were developmental or democracy-orientated in nature.  Recently though, the two 
previously specific types have begun to merge.  
The United States government has become much more effective in the use and 
utilization of NGO’s in furthering aid programs.  A primary goal of using NGOs is to 
concentrate at a much lower level of assistance geared toward reaching the people more 
directly.  If necessary, NGO’s have even been used for the primary purpose of attempting 
to all avoid all together the political bureaucracy that has hampered so many aid 
programs in Latin American countries in the past. NGO’s have been used for a variety of 
things from food distribution to voter monitoring with varying degrees of success.55  The 
U.S. government has also used NGO’s in monitoring and applying pressure to local 
government officials on subjects such as human rights, political transparency, judicial 
reform, and media openness.56 
As the U.S. government’s focus shifted toward civil society development, its deep 
involvement in NGOs has began to cause an overlapping of duties within many of these 
same NGOs.  The U.S.-NGO cooperation while seeming more sensible and effective did 
also create some unexpected hardships for certain NGOs.  The perception began to form 
that NGO’s started becoming merely tools of the U.S. government, thereby loosing some 
of their ‘independent’ status in the eyes of the Brazilian government and just as 
importantly, a lot of the locals they were intended to assist. 57   
Another factor greatly influencing the relationship between Brazil and the United 
States during this same time period has been trade.  Trade in general and the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement specifically, has been a particularly large factor 
in the relationship between these two large nations as of late.  As co-chairmen for the 
FTAA negations until its scheduled completion in January 2005, Brazil and the United 
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States have been on diametrically opposed views on most of the measures put before the 
different negotiating groups.  While both sides want increased trade and more open 
markets, the compromises have been slow in coming.  Brazil has accused the United 
States of increasing subsidies to its own farmers against the spirit of the FTAA (to the 
tune of tens of billions of dollars annually).  In the subcommittees of ‘Market Access’, 
‘Agriculture’, and ‘Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties’, Brazil has 
actually filed formal complaints against the United States in the WTO to attempt to force 
the U.S. to discontinue practices that Brazil sees as illegal.  In the specific subcommittees 
of ‘Intellectual Property Rights’, ‘Government Procurement’, and “Services’,   the U.S. 
has accused Brazil of being too protective of its industries by maintaining relatively high 
tariffs and woefully lacking in its policing of intellectual property rights violations. 
The use of hard power on the part of the U.S. has had the negative consequence of 
influencing Brazil into bringing an unexpected participant into the FTAA negotiations.  
The unexpected and peripheral influencer into the negotiating mix has been the European 
Union (EU)58.  As Brazil has effectively demonstrated in the past, it has brought in 
another player in which to pit the United States against in order to gain a more favorable 
economic and trade agreement.  Brazil and the EU have been in separate but parallel 
negotiations on trade pacts that could adversely affect the U.S.  Realistically though, the 
EU’s primary interest in Latin America is merely an attempt to hedge its bets.  The EU 
does not want to see a too-powerful free trade area in the Western hemisphere which 
would adversely affect its struggling trade, in relation to the United States’. 
In a report by the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) office, the U.S. 
just finalized a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Central America.59  Along with 
agreements with the Andean countries60, the USTR has announced FTA discussions with 
Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and Panama - all these within the last several 
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months.61 The only logical way Brazil can view these developments is as a flanking 
maneuver against any future economical inroads to the highly desired and lucrative 
markets of the U.S. economy.  The United States is again demonstrating its propensity for 
using hard power for short term concessions over the possibility of long-term beneficial 
agreements through the use of soft power.  The United States is not realistically 
considering the possibility of a backlash to its hard power tactics toward Brazil where in 
fact it is a real possibility.   
E. BRAZIL HISTORIC ANALYSIS 
The initial period of study (1930s to 1964) can be generally characterized as the 
United States consolidating support from Brazil through the predominant use of soft 
power.  The United States and its increasing involvement in WWII allowed Brazil to 
enjoy a favorable position in reference to negotiations with the U.S.  The United States 
used a combination of economic assistance, diplomatic overtures, military assistance, 
opening trade markets, and cultural propaganda to influence Brazilians into a ‘better’ 
understanding and acceptance of American views.   
The effectiveness of each of the individual methods can be debated.  What is not 
debatable is the fact that the United States used many different methods.  The diversity 
and intensity of some of the methods demonstrated just how important the U.S. felt Brazil 
was during this period in America’s history.  Despite the overtly coercive tactics 
available to the U.S., it appeared to chose a more subtle, cooperative, and cooptive option 
before and during WWII.  The strong support made available to the U.S by Brazil is a 
demonstration of the effectiveness in cementing the relationship the U.S. achieved with 
one of the largest nations in the hemisphere. 
As the United States has been accused on multiple occasions in the past, 
immediately after the threat of the war in Europe dissipated, so too did the United States’ 
interest in the utilization of soft power.  Under President Truman, Eisenhower, and even 
Kennedy’s administrations, Brazil was faced with a very new and unexpected reality.  No 
one in Brazil appreciated the less respectful manner in which they felt they were being 
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treated by the United States after their immediate services were no longer required at 
war’s end.  The United States no longer “needed” Brazil and therefore Brazil’s concerns 
were no longer a U.S. concern or priority.  One of the most painful realities for Brazil 
was the manner in which its request for a permanent seat on the Security Council was 
summarily ignored by the U.S. immediately following WWII.  This fact is still a serious 
issue in U.S.-Brazil relations over half a century later.   
Under the Kennedy administration, Brazil was faced with very schizophrenic 
policies and an odd and confusing use of both hard power and soft power.  President 
Kennedy instituted the Alliance for Progress initiative, promising tens of billions of 
dollars to Latin America for its economic, social, and industrial development.  
Simultaneously, Kennedy also increased the use of the CIA and its less-than-scrupulous 
tactics in an attempt to influence Brazilian politics.  Despite the use of the CIA though, 
President Kennedy did agree to an emergency loan to Brazil demonstrating a willingness 
to work in the open and for the sincere improvement of Brazil-U.S. relations.  The 
request for the loan came directly from Brazilian President Goulart during a visit by him 
to the White House in 1962.  The explicit purpose of the loan was to fight communism in 
the Brazilian Northeast by improving the living standards as per the Alliance for Progress 
tenants.62 By the end of 1963, it seemed clear that Goulart was not able to implement the 
reforms he stated and the loan was recalled.  The U.S. intention to use soft power 
influence over a terse relationship had gone from bad to worse. 
When Brazil’s president began instituting land reforms to help with the wealth 
inequality, the United States took this as an indication of socialism and further evidence 
of communist influence in the country.  In the view of the United States at the time, 
where there was socialism, communism was not far behind and was in the logical 
progression of things.  For this reason, along with the failed implementation of the 
Alliance for Progress in Brazil, the United States immediately began cutting economic 
aid.  Between the disruption of economic aid and the subtle encouragement to the 
military, a military coup became all but inevitable.  The fact that the United States 
immediately reinstituting economic aid after the coup only further confirmed the U.S. as 
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a strong supporter of the overthrow of a democratically elected government.63  At the 
end of this first period of study, while the United States predominantly practiced soft 
power and had very good relations with Brazil, the United States’ tactics became 
inconsistent, ineffective, and even counterproductive.  In the end, the United States 
received from Brazil excellent support for WWII.  In return, Brazil received from the 
United States, a military coup. 
The second period (1964 to 1991) proved to be unfortunately no better in 
reference to the consistency or effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy than the first period.  
The first 10 years of this second phase (under Presidents Johnson and Nixon) proved 
difficult for Latin America.  President Johnson was not interested in getting too involved 
with Latin America and established the informal policy to accept Latin American 
governments “as is”.64  Under President Nixon and his administration’s hard power 
heavy use of the CIA, stability and consistency in the region again became the driving 
force of foreign policy.  A perfect and sad example of this is the Nixon’s administration 
involvement in Chile and the rise to power of General Pinochet.  Thirty years after he 
came to power, political and human right issues are still surfacing affecting the country 
deeply and continuously producing repercussions stalling the economic development of a 
resource rich country.  The tactics and form of hard power was not nearly as important as 
the results the current governmental administration hoped they would provide.  It was 
during the Nixon administration where the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funds reached its lowest point of contributions to Latin America 
in the forty year period between the 1950s and 1990s. 65  Conversely, hard power 
through military aid to Brazil continued to increase and peaked during the Nixon 
administration without regard to democratic ideals or human suffering.66  This in and of 
itself demonstrated a lack of concern for economic expansion, democratic development, 
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or the application of any soft power.  During this period, hard power was by far the 
definitive rule rather than the exception.   
Despite Carter’s emphasis on human rights, it must be emphasized that his 
approach must also be classified as hard power.  The rationale behind the hard power 
classification is that despite Carter’s intentions, his approach was not to co-opt anyone or 
any government.  His specific intent was to coerce authoritarian governments into 
improving their human rights records or be cut-off from any and all future American aid.  
This hard power strategy failed in short-term results when the Brazilian government 
decided to discontinue accepting certain military aid before the Carter administration had 
time to give the regime any formal ultimatum.  The Brazilian government apparently had 
had enough of America’s schizophrenic policies and chose to terminate rather than be 
terminated.  Interestingly enough, President Carter’s plan to influence the elite while 
unsuccessful, did have the unexpected result of endearing the poor and oppressed middle-
class into admiring the U.S. and its views on human rights.  The approach by the Carter 
administration produced soft power results by co-opting the majority of oppressed in 
Brazil – producing support a generation later when those oppressed came to power after 
the dictatorship rule ended. 
Not since President Harry S. Truman had Latin America been able to experience 
the consistency of a full two-term President as they did under President Reagan.  But 
again, if there is nothing else that the United States is consistent on concerning foreign 
policy, it is its unvarying inconsistency.  President Reagan vowed to defeat communism 
and bring strength to the United States.  It was common knowledge that Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick believed that it was in the United States’ best interest to support Brazil’s 
authoritarian regimes as long as they did not ‘deteriorate’ into a totalitarian regime.  With 
a firm belief in hard power, the U.S. under Reagan increased USAID funding for Latin 
America from a low of $638 million at the beginning of the Carter administration to a 
peak of $2.3 billion just after the beginning of President Reagan’s first term.67  
Interestingly enough, funding for Brazil did not substantially increase from the lows 
suffered during the Carter administration’s cuts.  However, while the Reagan 
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administration did not significantly increase funding for Brazil, neither did it attempt to 
highlight its human rights abuses and violations.  The mix of hard power and soft power 
application in Brazil was a result more from domestic politicking than from any cohesive 
or comprehensive strategic plan to help ensure the flourishing of democracy.  Having the 
“Third Wave of Democracy”68 sweep through Latin America during the Reagan 
administration and the Soviet Union collapsing just after Reagan left office in 1988 
provided an indelible legacy for the Reagan administration.  Unfortunately, those two 
experiences had more to do with coincidence than with any great American policy 
strategy that the Reagan administration had instituted.   
The final phase being analyzed in this chapter (1992 to 2004) is simplified for two 
reasons.  The first reason is due to the relatively short time period.  The second reason is 
based on the fact that most of this stage occurred during the two-term presidency of 
Clinton.  The end of the Cold War brought a dramatic shift of focus in foreign policy.  
The United States could now more effectively get away from its previous hard power 
tactics of attempting to maintain stability by staving off the invasion of communism 
throughout the region.  The U.S. administration could now concentrate on its soft power 
capabilities to influence through cooption rather than coercion.   
The Clinton administration did begin increasing aid in many different areas.  The 
only region to receive more USAID funds for the purpose of promoting democracy than 
Latin America during Clinton’s presidency was Eastern Europe and Russia.69 
Maximizing the potential soft power influence that the United States could have after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, proved to be too tempting a target.70  Additionally, it was 
civil society vice the executive or judicial branches of governments that became the 
direct targets for the funds in both regions of the world.   
President Clinton seemed to grasp the importance of sincerity in reference to the 
dilemmas being faced by Latin Americans, and specifically Brazilians.  His attempts at 
implementing soft power in Latin America are commendable – the results though, 
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debatable.  President Clinton hosted a “Summit of the Americas” in Miami in 1994 
representing the first such gathering in almost 30 years.71 He officially apologized for the 
role the United States played in Guatemala in the 1950s, admitting guilt and promising to 
ensure that the same mistake would never be repeated.72  President Clinton also pushed 
for a western hemisphere free trade area to help increase economic prosperity for all of 
Latin America.   
The Clinton administration appeared to go out of its way to portray the United 
States as a caring and compassionate nation.  President Clinton wanted to demonstrate the 
United States as the gleaming example of the positive virtues of decency and democracy.  
Based on the efforts by the Clinton administration, one would expect that democracy and 
the United States would have been viewed in a more favorable light and that the 
advantages of democracy and the example that the U.S. established as a nation would be 
elevated.  Interestingly enough, in a Latinobarometro poll, the number of Brazilians who 
felt that democracy was a favorable form of government compared to any other form of 
government actually dropped from 50 % to 30 % from the middle of the Clinton 
administration to the end.73 74 While it would be unfair to say this was due to President 
Clinton and not at least in part on some of the economic hardships being experienced in 
Brazil at the time, the decline began immediately after Congress denied the President’s 
bid for fast-track authorization.  This denial all but sank any chance Latin America had in 
believing the United States’ sincerity about opening its markets to free trade with Latin 
America. The belief that the United States’ main interest remained its own economy, 
continued to be Latin America’s over-riding perception.  
After President George W. Bush came into office in 2000, he was able to acquire 
the crucial fast-track authority.  While this demonstrated a new hope for progress on the 
faltering FTAA negotiations, it has not a guarantee of completion.  Negotiations 
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progressed under the new president’s fast-track authorization from the U.S Congress.  In 
the wake of multiple FTAA subcommittee and negotiating group impasses, the Bush 
administration began using its fast-track authority to approve a litany of agreements with 
Latin America countries involved with Brazil and Venezuela.  The impression being that 
the U.S. was implementing hard power to force Brazil to acquiesce.  History has shown 
that this does not work well with Brazil.   
Early in the Bush administration was the tragic event of “9/11”.75  Despite the 
difficulties between Brazil and the U.S., it was Brazil that initiated the OAS agreement in 
collectively condemning the attacks.  Brazil also ensured the U.S. of Brazil’s 
commitment to the Rio pact in that an attack on one of the members of OAS constituted 
an attack on all the members.  Brazil’s demonstration of solidarity during an extremely 
difficult period in U.S. history demonstrated its willingness to put disagreements aside, 
albeit temporarily.  Brazil also demonstrated its show of support for others in the larger 
scheme and the best example of global politics, unity, and character. 
The author is not suggesting that the U.S. acquiesce on all points of incongruity 
being debated in the FTAA subcommittees.  History has demonstrated that Brazil’s 
cooperation can not be assumed or taken for granted either.  The United States needs to 
consider acquiescing on small but salient aspects of the FTAA negotiations with 
President Lula da Silva.  This would provide President Lula the ability to open the win-
set available to him in the political two-level game among himself, the Brazilian 
government, and the Brazilian populous.   
Of course, 9/11 imposes additional difficulty in trade negotiations.  With security 
instantaneously becoming of paramount importance to the U.S., negotiations have 
become marred in side issues dealing with the U.S. attempting to increase its security.  
One perfect example is the new requirement for photographs and finger printing of all 
Brazilians entering the United States.  With ‘reciprocity’ being a very large factor in 
U.S.-Brazil relations, Brazil shortly there after instituted the same policy for Americans 
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entering Brazil.76  While there are valid points on both sides, the purpose for illuminating 
this less than sanguine point is to highlight the tangential factors that have affected 
negotiations between two of the largest, both physically and economically, countries in 
the hemisphere.     
A demonstration of soft power on the part of the United States would provide two 
benefits.  The first benefit would provide increased odds of reaching a more equitable 
FTAA arrangement prior to the deadline of December 2005.  The second benefit would 
to aid the domestic political standing of a Brazilian president that has demonstrated good 
faith toward the international community, the IMF, World Bank, and the United States.   
There are other ill-consequences of the United States’ insistence on the hard 
power approach to trade negotiations with Brazil.  One would be the strengthening of 
Mercosur.  Brazil has consistently insisted that Mercosur negotiate as a block vice as 
individual countries.  The intent is to provide more strength in negotiations against such a 
huge economic might as the single country of the U.S.  A second alternative would be a 
Latin America Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA).  With Venezuela squarely opposed to 
any increase of the U.S. hegemonic power in the region, it would seriously consider 
multitude concessions to convince Brazil that it should look inward prior to considering 
any outward agreement with the United States.   
It is important to note some of the shortcomings of the previously mentioned 
options.  While a negotiation with the EU is a good strategic approach for Brazil to 
undertake, its end goal is not realistic.  Due to the fact that the EU’s tariffs tend to be 
higher than the United States’, consideration of the EU dropping its tariffs to allow 
greater access for Brazil is not realistic in the short term.  Additionally, despite Brazil’s 
disgust with the U.S. and its high subsidies, France has even higher subsidies for its 
farmers than even the U.S.  Again, expecting France to decrease its government subsidies 
for the sake of Brazil is not realistic.  LAFTA has one primary shortcoming.  Agreements 
among all Latin American countries in and of itself would prove nearly impossible at 
best. Latin America’s economic diversity is too lacking to allow for sustained increased 
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trade primarily in and amongst themselves, and therefore is not economically feasible at 
this time.   
The one option that should frighten the U.S. is China.  China’s economic 
development is absorbing as many resources as its economy can handle.  These not only 
include Brazil’s natural resources and steal technology, but Venezuela’s petroleum 
products.  Having a population base nearly four times that of the United States’, China is 
a point of consideration and concern.  
President Lula’s economic policies have demonstrated incredible discipline.  His 
administration has also demonstrated to the international community Brazil’s good faith 
in repaying billions of dollars in loans.  Brazil’s support of the UN and the U.S. by taking 
the lead in the Peacekeeping force in Haiti should also be commended.  The United States 
has more to gain both regionally and internationally by having a strong Brazilian 
president as an ally instead of an adversary.  The best way to ensure President Lula’s 
ability to continue leading his nation toward a stronger and more consolidated democracy 
is through support of economic development.  The U.S. could ensure that progress by 
reciprocating the good will that Brazil has extended and allow President Lula the 
opportunity to bring home some victories through soft power endorsements by the United 
States.  
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III. VENEZUELA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 70 years, the United States has employed very specific and 
intentional policies and programs toward Brazilian issues and concerns.  The seemingly 
cavalier attitude taken toward Venezuela by contrast during this same period, directly 
contradicts the painstaking care taken by the U.S. in cultivating its relationship with 
Brazil.  Whether the contrasting policies have been due to Brazil’s size, its natural 
resources77, or based on Brazilian troop support of the Allied Powers during WWII, is 
beyond the purview of this thesis.  While comparisons in foreign policies may be made 
between Brazil and Venezuela, the intent of this thesis chapter is not to analyze 
contradictory diplomatic approaches, but to analyze the approach the U.S. has taken 
toward Venezuela as an individual country.  
Venezuela is an important nation to the United States, both for historic and 
current commonalities.  Its fight for independence has many parallels with that of the 
United States’ and its relevance concerning current issues are also undeniable.  
Venezuela plays an essential role in U.S. foreign policy on such central issues as the war 
on drugs, war on terrorism, being a major U.S. oil supplier, the FTAA, and especially on 
its current relations with Cuba. 
The following chapter highlights three main areas of U.S.-Venezuelan relations 
and the hard power / soft power interactions and politics between the two.  The first area 
is the United States and Venezuela’s political history and America’s propensity for using 
hard power with Venezuela throughout that history.  The second focus is on the last six 
years during and since the first election of Hugo Chavez Frias as Venezuela’s 
democratically elected president.  The chapter dedicates its final section to the specific 
relationship between Venezuela and Cuba.   
The chapter research focuses on how the U.S. used hard power / soft power 
towards Venezuela and its effectiveness in influencing political outcomes.  What effect if 
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any did the U.S. hard power policies have in Venezuela?  It shows the relationship 
between hard power application by the U.S. and the changing attitudes of Venezuelans 
toward the United States and democracy.  These are then compared and contrasted with 
the soft power approach successfully applied by Cuba in Venezuela. 
B. U.S.-VENEZUELAN RELATIONS 
1. 1800s 
The history of cooperation between Venezuela and the United States dates back to 
Venezuela’s fight for independence in 1811.  The United States was not the first country 
to recognize Venezuela’s independence, unlike the case with Brazil.  Venezuela none the 
less has always held a unique historical position in America’s foreign policy.  Venezuela 
was the first recipient nation to ever receive an official U.S. foreign aid bill.  In May 
1812, Venezuela received $150,000 in disaster relief from the United States in response 
to a devastating earthquake.78  Despite the close relationship that these two countries 
have shared, that relationship has none the less been tested.     
Venezuelans have always had a tendency to consider the United States’ and 
Venezuela’s history as being parallel.  The belief provided an interesting bond between 
the two relatively distant countries in the early 1800s.  Both countries fought for their 
independence from European colonial powers, wanted a united nation and democratic 
self-rule.  Progressively thinking, both countries also wanted free trade and international 
recognition at a very early point in their respective independence.  Many Venezuelan 
historians have also drawn the comparison between the United States’ General George 
Washington and Venezuelan’s General Simon Bolivar.  Both generals are considered 
great leaders, politically and militarily, and are credited for leading the charge for their 
respective country’s independence.79   
Despite the similar origins and battles for independence, the United States’ and 
Venezuela’s later development diverged dramatically.  In the early 1800s while 
Venezuelans were fighting Spain for their independence, the United States was enjoying 
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an ongoing trade relationship with Venezuela’s colonial master, Spain.  Partly based on 
the trade relationship, the United States was compelled to ignore Venezuelan patriots’ 
early cries for assistance in their fight.  Despite Venezuela declaring its independence in 
1811, the U.S. maintained its political neutrality during Venezuela’s ten year struggle for 
its independence from its former colonial power.80  It is a question worth asking as to 
whether the fledgling U.S. could have actually done much to effectively assist 
Venezuelans in garnering its independence from Spain.  That the United States chose to 
do nothing to assist Venezuela however, spoke volumes as to its probable future policy 
inclinations. 
In 1895 Venezuela again asked for U.S. assistance.  Venezuela was embroiled in a 
border dispute with the English colony of British Guyana81.  When England attempted to 
“annex” land for British Guyana from Venezuela, the United States stepped in.  The U.S. 
justification for its involvement in the matter was the Monroe Doctrine.   
It was 72 years earlier in 1823 during the initial introduction and implementation 
of the Monroe Doctrine where most Venezuelan elites gained their understanding of the 
doctrine.  The Venezuelan elites were surprisingly supportive of the U.S. policy.  The 
mentality of Venezuelans toward the Monroe Doctrine at the time was based on the 
feeling of shared history and general geographical proximity - particularly in relation to 
the worrisome European powers.  Venezuela believed at the time that having a strong 
“ally” willing to intervene on its behalf would prove very beneficial.8283  
England eventually capitulated to the U.S. concerning the border dispute with 
Venezuela and its demand for arbitration.  By agreeing to U.S. led arbitration between 
Venezuela and themselves, England unofficially acknowledged America’s preeminent 
hegemonic influence in the hemisphere.  The episode was important in that America was 
willing to support Venezuela at this point, though predominantly for self-serving reasons.  
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In a broader political scope than just U.S. intervention, was that by acquiescing to U.S. 
demands, Great Britain unofficially acknowledged the Monroe Doctrine.84   
Concerning this particular call by Venezuela for assistance from the United 
States, two points become significant.  The first point is that it took the United States 
nearly 25 years of Venezuela’s constant letters and diplomatic pleas before it actually 
became officially involved in the border dispute with Great Britain.  When the United 
States eventually did involve itself, it was primarily due to the long-term significant 
ramifications on U.S. relations that this particular incident would have with other 
European nations.     
The second point concerns the actual outcome of arbitration between interested 
parties.  When the United States subsequently agreed to help Venezuela by forcing Great 
Britain to an arbitration panel, Venezuela was actually excluded from all negotiations.  
Through the use of hard power tactics by the United States and concessions primarily on 
the part of Venezuela, the Venezuelan administration was eventually ‘allowed’ to 
recommend the United States’ Supreme Court Justice as its representative to the 
arbitration.  In the end, England was awarded nearly everything it asked for except the 
Orinoco River delta in the very north-east corner of what is now Venezuela.85   The 
United States again demonstrated its priorities to Venezuela through the use of hard 
power.  The point of this example is not meant as a judgment call against the U.S.; it 
merely exemplifies historical fact, foreign policy methodology, and political necessity by 
the U.S. at the time of the event.    
2. Oil and the 20th Century 
U.S - Venezuelan relations did not begin the 20th century under much better 
circumstances than the beginning of the 19th century.  The early 1900s found Venezuela 
embroiled in failed negotiations with almost ten different European countries claiming 
monies due from unpaid customs receipts (the primary means of government revenue 
during this time period).  In an attempt to force Venezuela to repay its debts, Germany, 
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Italy, and Great Britain instituted a naval blockade of the country’s most vital trade ports 
to force repayment of all Venezuela’s debts.   
The United States intervened at the behest of the Venezuelan government once 
again.  This time, the U.S. compelled the European powers to discontinue the blockade.86  
During this incident, the United States arguably sided with Venezuela concerning the 
disputed debts.  The U.S. was able to convince many European countries to drop a large 
percentage of its claims and allegations against Venezuela and agree to only a portion of 
reparations originally demanded.  The U.S was able to reorganize Venezuelan debts to 
the general satisfaction of most of the litigating nations.  However, through hard power 
coercion, the U.S. had Venezuela agree to repay nearly 100 % of monies due to the more 
important powers in Europe: Germany, Italy, and Great Britain.  Part of the reasoning 
was that the U.S. felt that these three countries bore the brunt of the cost in pushing for 
repayment and should be compensated.  Despite siding with Venezuela on the majority of 
the debt deliberations, the U.S. ensured that at least the European powers were taken care 
of.  Venezuela was starting to realize the potential folly of the type of relationship it was 
allowing itself to form with the United States.  The concern over the relationship was best 
stated by Venezuela’s then-president Cipriano Castro when he declared that he feared 
Venezuela was merely trading one oppressive power for another. 87  This episode not 
only marked the United States’ undisputed hegemony in the hemisphere, but also its 
dominance over Venezuela.  Up to this point, Venezuela truly believed it was worthy of 
being considered America’s equal. 
In 1914, there was a degree of mending to the strained relationship between 
Venezuela and the United States.  What allowed Venezuela to regain some face-saving 
and special-relation status with the hegemon to the North was the country’s discovery of 
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huge oil deposits.88  This development in Venezuela’s political and economic history 
helped set it apart from the rest of South America.89   
Venezuela’s oil discovery quickly led to United States petroleum companies 
imbedding themselves in Venezuela.  The commercial affiliation began to cause great 
discontent in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.  Increasing dissatisfaction among local 
Venezuelans was perpetuated by the U.S. oil companies forming American enclaves 
within Venezuela and intentionally excluding local Venezuelan workers from enjoying 
the benefits and special duty free imports designed specifically and exclusively for the 
Americans.90 The preferential treatment of American workers over local employees and 
Venezuela’s seemingly inability to stop or even control the inequality, only added to the 
dissatisfaction and the continued rise in anti-Americanism.  The unacceptable behavior 
among some American workers and their blatant disregard for local rules and customs 
only exasperated the conviction among Venezuelans that the U.S was less an ally and 
more an opportunist.91  The belief was quickly forming that Americans were elitist snobs 
who felt they were above the law and believed that American interests were more 
important than the local’s interest whose natural resources Americans were exploiting. 
In the early 1940s, Venezuela began to experience major political destabilization.  
In 1945 and 1948 the destabilization led to government administrations being overthrown 
by golpes92.  The 1948 over throw of the democratically elected leader did lead to debate 
in Washington D.C.  The deliberation was as to whether the U.S. should acknowledge the 
new military government or not.  The U.S. ambassador to Venezuela at the time cabled 
President Truman and stated, “While I deplore the overthrow of constitutional 
governments by force, I am of the opinion that our national interests in Venezuela would 
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be best served by recognizing the Junta.”93 This mentality only led to further fuel the 
belief that the U.S was more interested in oil than democracy.  In January 1949, the U.S. 
formally recognized the military junta as the legal government of Venezuela, thereby 
ensuring continuity in its oil and economic transactions.     
In neither the 1945 nor the 1948 overthrow is there concrete evidence of the U.S. 
being directly involved.  If the U.S. was not directly involved though, it was at least 
informed of the impending overthrows.  These governmental overthrows and the United 
States’ lack of willingness to intervene do not demonstrate hard power.  What the 
inaction of the U.S. does demonstrate is a lack of concern over the extension of 
democracy.  It also demonstrates to Venezuelans, a U.S. foreign policy propensity to 
prioritize economics over democracy.  United States cultural soft power influence 
continued to decrease as anti-Americanism continued to rise.  
What should not be overlooked by historians in either country is the cultural or 
soft power influence the United States was having on Venezuela’s middle and upper 
class.  While the majority of Venezuelans who could afford ‘things American’ were 
strong supporters of the U.S. and its soft power influence of opulence and culture, there 
were those that were concerned.  To the dismay of some Venezuelans, “The use of such a 
formidable weapon [as film] can inculcate a new ideology, a new system of customs, 
values, and ways of thinking in [Venezuelan] society.”94  By 1949, Nelson Rockefeller 
had opened the first supermarket in Venezuela and by 1953 there were six Sears, 
Roebuck and Company outlets.95  The high demand for U.S. goods, particularly among 
the Venezuelan middle-class could not be satiated.  Demand for all products from the 
U.S. was so high that, new trade agreements on the importation of U.S. agricultural goods 
though even forced some Venezuelan farmers out of business.  During the 1950’s 
Venezuela became the third largest importer of American agricultural products in the 
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Western Hemisphere.96  This is mentioned to emphasize the level of influence that 
American culture and its soft power was having on a foreign society.   
Despite some of the negative rhetoric being directed at the U.S., there were many 
positive effects Americans and American culture had in Venezuela as well.  As 
interaction between Americans and Venezuelans developed, good examples of American 
integration into Venezuelan society also increased.  Some examples of positive soft 
power Americana introduced into the Venezuelan middle-class and the more elite society 
were things such as little league baseball, the YMCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Parent-
Teacher Associations, as well as combined U.S.-Venezuelan schools.  In the 1950s, 65% 
of the films shown in Venezuela were American produced and six of the most popular 
magazines in Venezuela were edited in the U.S.97  By the end of the 1950s, English 
replaced French as the second most common language in Venezuela.   
Another effect of American soft power and cultural influence was that American 
universities replaced French educational institutions as a must for the children of the 
upper middle class and Venezuelan elite.98  As more Venezuelan elites began educating 
their children in America, the American ideals began to become deeply imbedded in 
these children.  As these children of the elite began to move into more influential 
positions, their understanding and appreciation for the United States aided in the 
increased cooperation between the two countries.  By the late 1950s, Venezuela had 
become one of the United States’ biggest supporters.  The Venezuelan middle and upper 
class had embraced and taken ownership of all things American and that influence would 
last approximately 50 years. 
As had occurred so often in the past, the United States’ historic tendency of 
vacillating and remaining unpredictable in its foreign policies did leave some 
Venezuelans bewildered, disappointed, and bitter.  The frustration of the larger segment 
of poor Venezuelan society developed over a very considerable time span.  From 
America’s refusal to aid in Venezuela’s fight for independence in 1811 to the U.S. 
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supporting military dictatorships in 1945, 1948, and again in 2002,99 some Venezuelans 
did not feel comfortable with having such a powerful nation so close.  Despite America’s 
democratic rhetoric during sporadic periods of peace, its hard power actions were tending 
to speak much louder than the soft power approach to the more affluent minority. 
In 1958 Vice-President Richard Nixon took a goodwill tour through multiple 
Latin American countries.  In May of that year, despite warnings from his own security 
force, Nixon went to Caracas, Venezuela.  During a transit between engagements, Vice 
President Nixon’s motorcade came under attack by local protestors.100 The episode 
highlighted the continuing rise in anti-Americanism that had been developing in 
Venezuela since even before the discovery of oil.  Adding to the anti-American attitudes 
was America’s possible involvement with the two military coups in the 1940s and the 
continuous lack of U.S. respect for the culture and laws of the country.  The Nixon 
incident illustrates the decaying relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela after years 
of a policy more generally referred to as benign neglect.101 102  
In 1958, due to an oil glut on the international market and falling prices, President 
Eisenhower established a U.S. import quota on almost all foreign oil.  Exempted from the 
stringent quotas were Mexico and Canada.  This overt use of economic hard power 
greatly alienated Venezuela which had always considered itself a political and economic 
friend to the United States.103  The demonstration of hard power against a country which 
considered itself a true ally only confused and angered many of Venezuela’s political 
elite.104   
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Despite many U.S. government policies concerning Venezuelan oil though, 
American soft power was continuing to influence a lot of Venezuelans.  Those being 
influenced though did not represent the majority of the population.  The Venezuelans that 
remained poor, even after the influx of billions of dollars in petroleum revenues and 
unable to experience or afford the Cultural Revolution unfortunately represented the 
majority.  It was the poor and ignored segments of Venezuelan society that attacked Vice 
President Nixon and rioted in the streets against the United States.  America’s soft power 
was effective, but the audience – while the elite – were also the minority.   
Despite the import quotas put into place by the U.S. in the 1950s, Venezuela 
continued to demonstrate its allegiance to America.  During the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, 
the Middle-East members of OPEC placed an oil embargo against the United States.  
Venezuela continued to provide the United States with badly needed oil in direct defiance 
of the other OPEC countries.105 While Venezuela’s main concern was economic 
considerations, it none the less chose its relationship with the United States (economic 
and political) over that of its relations with fellow OPEC members. 
One year later in 1974, President Gerald Ford was forced by Congress to pass a 
Trade Reform Act.106  The hard power protectionist nature of the trade act penalized all 
OPEC countries.  The Act also unintentionally affected Venezuela and Ecuador as OPEC 
Charter members.  The two countries were not given any special compensation or 
differentiation by the U.S. despite their continued support of America.107  Again, the hard 
power tactics regularly used against a relatively benign country such as Venezuela only 
further eroded any goodwill that may have existed between Venezuela and the 
economically oil dependent hegemon to the north.   
The continued lack of consideration or special compensation for Venezuela 
directly led to decreasing support for U.S. foreign policy in the region whether related to 
oil or not.  Any soft power or cultural influence the U.S. may have had with Venezuela 
had finally been depleted.  Policies dealing with the isolationist attitudes of the United 
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States toward Cuba became increasingly ignored by Latin American countries.  The 
United States’ heavy hand and incessant use of hard power in the region drove many 
Latin America countries to actually embrace Cuba.  Responding to the United States’ 
Reform Act of 1974, Latin America actually developed its own trade pact, deliberately 
excluding the United States and intentionally including Cuba.  The United States’ 
inability to differentiate Venezuela as a serious concern or neighbor, only led to long-
term damage, lost support, and detrimental regional policies.  The continued hard power 
foreign policy approach by the U.S. thereby consistently eroded its own long-term 
influence based on near-sighted and short term goals.  
The Falklands/Malvinas War with Argentina in 1982 only exacerbated the anti-
American sentiment in both Brazil and Venezuela - not to mention Argentina. The United 
States’ failure to support the Rio Pact108 only reinforced pre-existing notions of a self-
serving United States in the minds of most Latin Americans.  The assumption was that 
despite a treaty signed by the United States, a mutual defense agreement among counties 
so unequal in relative strength was completely anecdotal.109 The U.S. also corroborated 
the existing sentiment in Venezuela that the United States’ greatest concern despite the 
existing treaties with its Latin America ‘allies’ was that what was best for the United 
States was the only thing that really mattered.  Subsequently, during the 
Falklands/Malvinas War, any consideration, logic, or credit the United States should have 
received for its decision to side with Great Britain was given no consideration.  This lack 
of consideration was despite the fact, argued the U.S., that Argentina was a military and 
oppressive dictatorship and was the uncontested aggressor in the conflict.  None of this 
mattered in comparison to the United States’ blatant disregard of the Rio Pact in the 
hearts and minds of Latin Americans.  
Venezuela continued to demonstrate its lack of support for the United States 
throughout the middle to late 1980s.  In 1983, Venezuela helped organize a group of 
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South and Central American countries called the Contadora Group.110  The Contadora 
Group involved Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, to name just a few.  It was 
designed to initiate peace processes and help establish stability in the Central American 
region by emphasizing arms limitations and promoting democracy.111  It attempted to 
counter the hard power military policies of the Reagan administration in the region 
during this period.  Despite the Contadora Group’s complete inability to counter-balance 
the military and economic might of the U.S., they none the less attempted to negotiate 
peace agreements within Central America.  The peace brokering processes conducted by 
the Contadora group ran counter to the intent of U.S. policy in the region at the time.   
Interestingly, the Contadora Group actually found supporters in D.C.  The group’s 
soft power influence and ideals of peace, humanitarian rights, international law, and 
democracy agreed with many in the democratically controlled U.S. Congress previously 
enjoyed by the Carter administration.112  While the amount of success may have seemed 
limited, one can only consider the possibility of increased violence if the group had not 
been there to counter the Reagan administration’s hard power policies.  The number of 
treaties was limited due to U.S. interference.  It would be safe to say though, that U.S. 
policy in Central America was also disrupted based on the groups efforts and soft power 
focus of poverty prevention and attempted economic development.  While it has yet to be 
seen, Venezuela’s roots as the Latin American democratic example set by Simon Bolivar 
nearly 200 years ago, may yet have life in the dream.  If Venezuela is the seed of Latin 
America unity, then the U.S. may unwittingly be playing the role of the guano.113  
Throughout its relationship with Venezuela, the United States continuously 
demonstrated a propensity to use hard power in its foreign relations.  The U.S. also 
demonstrated a lack of ability or even willingness to understand the intricacies of the 
Venezuela psyche.  The continuous lack of U.S. willingness to appreciate the relationship 
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that Venezuelan’s felt they had earned with the U.S., only cemented Venezuela’s harsh 
feeling for its hegemonic neighbor and its cultural influence.   
3. Hugo Chavez 
In 1998 a former failed coup leader, Lt. Col. Hugo Chavez Frias, was elected 
president of Venezuela.  He ran for election an on a platform of populism, anti-corruption 
and strong nationalism. 114 After being elected as president, he spent a large portion of his 
time visiting other countries and its leaders.  His visits particularly to Iraq and Cuba 
greatly concerned the United States. 
Despite President Chavez’ propensity for just narrowly operating within the bare 
limits of the Venezuelan constitution,115 the United States has had many grave concerns 
about this new leader.  One concern of the United States’ was that President Chavez had 
no apparent apprehension regarding upsetting Washington.  He proved this by his visits 
to Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro shortly after being elected.  
In April 2002, in a bit of irony, there was a military coup that ousted the former 
1992 coup leader for two days. The day after the coup, the United States quickly 
recognized the new civilian leader put in by the military junta.  President Chavez was 
reinstated as president the next day, foiling the coup attempt.  This early 
acknowledgement of a new president further strained relations between Washington and 
Caracas. As the self-proclaimed champions of democracy, the United States lost a 
considerable amount of credibility, influence, and soft power in its lack of support for 
Venezuelan democracy.  Many in Latin America questioned the motivation of the United 
States in its failure to condemn the removal of a democratically elected president and to 
so quickly acknowledge the replacement at the hands of leaders of a military coup.  If 
there were any doubts before in President Chavez’ mind or in the minds of his supporters, 
there were none now – the United States was neither friend nor ally of democracy. 
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In December 2002, President Chavez fired most of the Board of Directors in the 
Venezuelan national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA).  
These were professionals, generally cosmopolitan in their outlook, supporters of 
international corporations, and pro-United States.  President Chavez considered these 
individuals collaborators of the ‘rancid oligarchy’ who undermined state control of the oil 
industry, and who he felt had developed a special relationship with corrupt international 
corporations.116  He then replaced these executives with those considered more loyal to 
the president as an individual rather than to the Presidential office.  These actions by 
President Chavez and the United States’ complete inability to influence him greatly 
concerned the U.S. on both economic (oil) related grounds and the signal it sent about 
Chávez’s determination to excise any pockets of pro-American sentiment within the 
Venezuelan state.   
After the PDVSA dismissal, there was a prolonged general strike led by workers 
in the oil sector.  The strikes led to a major disruption of oil sales from Venezuela causing 
severe economic crisis in the country due to declining oil revenues.  The strikes and 
economic downturn caused a severe polarizing effect.  There were many in Washington 
that expected Chavez to crumble under the economic and financial hemorrhaging due to 
the near complete halt of oil sales.  Despite Washington’s best predictions, Chavez 
refused compromises or concessions and eventually outlasted the organizers of the 
strikes. 
4. Cuba-Venezuela Relations 
The difficult historic relationship between Venezuela and Cuba could not be more 
different than Venezuela’s supportive historic relationship with the United States.  The 
encounters and interactions between Venezuela and Cuba while historically few and brief 
were none the less, tumultuous.  This fact only makes the current relationship between 
these two countries all the more surprising and extraordinary.   
Some of the earlier encounters between Venezuela and Cuba began shortly after 
Venezuela gained its full independence from Spain.  From 1870 to 1873, Venezuela 
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directly aided Cuban rebels in an attempt to overthrow the same Spanish regime from 
which Venezuela fought so hard to garner its independence.117  It was the eventual 
subjugation of Spain at the hands of the United States in 1898 interestingly enough that 
forced Spain to relinquish all rights to the island nation.118  The support the U.S provided 
to Cuba for its independence was the very support that the United States had refused to 
give Venezuela over 50 years earlier.  Unlike Venezuela though, the U.S. maintained 
very strict controls in Cuba and used extreme hard power with impunity through the use 
of its military and of the Platt Amendment.119 
The next significant involvement between Venezuela and Cuba occurred 
approximately 90 years later.  In 1964 shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, in an ironic 
twist Cuba began supplying leftist guerrillas in Venezuela with arms.  Cuba’s intent was 
to thwart the impending elections threatening to lead Venezuela to a democratic 
transition.  Cuba also wanted to prevent democracy from re-rooting in Venezuela as well 
as to foment a Cuban style revolution.120  It appeared as if Cuba was attempting to 
reassert itself after the embarrassing stand-off of the Cuban Missile Crisis where the 
USSR abandoned Cuba. 
Cuba’s hard power assistance to Venezuelan rebels to prevent the democratic 
elections caused extensive havoc in Venezuela. Two naval bases experienced significant 
uprisings led by Venezuelan officers sympathetic to the nationalistic stance.  In great 
contrast to the oppressive hard power Cuban leadership demonstrated by Fidel Castro, 
Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt chose leniency against the Cuban 
sympathizers.  President Betancourt’s soft power approach produced some very 
interesting results.  By 1970 all of the jailed rebels had been freed and some even held 
positions as Congressmen in Venezuela years after the uprisings.121 
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In 1992, Lt. Col. Chavez was imprisoned for a failed coup attempt in Venezuela 
against the democratically elected, though allegedly corrupt, president.  After two years 
he was released from prison and went to Argentina and Cuba.  What meetings or 
discussions occurred between Lt. Col. Chavez and Fidel Castro in Cuba are not known.  
What is obvious from Chavez’ trip to Cuba is the close relationship that seemed to have 
developed between Lt. Col. Chavez and the leader of Cuba.  Upon Chavez’s return to 
Venezuela, he traded his military rhetoric for political activism, and again aimed for the 
presidency.  This time, Hugo Chavez chose democratic elections to capture power.  Hugo 
Chavez’ successful bid for the presidency in 1998 was marked by one of the largest 
electoral majorities in Venezuela’s recent democratic history.122 
President Chavez and President Castro’s relationship continued to flourish after 
1998 to a point that very few would have predicted possible based on the two countries’ 
historic and combative past.  Instead of involving itself in Venezuela’s military or 
economic affairs directly, Cuba chose a more subtle soft power approach to its 
relationship with Venezuela.  There are currently thousands of Cuban doctors, teachers, 
aid workers, and ‘advisors’ in Venezuela.  These aid workers have been dispersed 
throughout most of Venezuela’s poorest communities providing all manners of 
humanitarian assistance at no charge to the local residents.123  These soft power aid 
programs initiated by Chavez and implemented by Castro have in fact been extremely 
powerful.  The programs success124 can be contrasted with the millions of U.S. dollars 
provided to independent Venezuelan NGOs by the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED).125 Despite this democracy assistance, a majority of Venezuelans decided against 
removing President Chavez from office during the 2004 Venezuelan presidential 
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referendum.  This event directly demonstrates the ability of soft power to be a more 
effective tool of influence in foreign policy.  
C. VENEZUELAN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
There are many reasons why Venezuela is important to the United States, not least 
because of oil.  The sooner Washington understands Venezuelan politics and the 
Venezuelan people, the better off both countries will be.  The first 100 years of U.S. 
foreign policy in Venezuela (1811 to 1914) was built on a weak foundation.  The U.S.-
Venezuelan relationship was one of sporadic attention, unexpected consequences, and to 
a large extent, benign neglect.  The United States was not directly interested in Venezuela 
and usually got involved only when asked repeatedly or when the interest of the United 
States was at stake. When the U.S. did get involved, it exercised a great deal of hard 
power either for or in the name of Venezuela.  While the U.S. did not always act in the 
best interest of Venezuela, very few countries would go directly against its own economic 
interests for the sake of a ‘third world’ nation whose troubles stemmed from 
mismanagement and corruption.  To judge the U.S. as ‘wrong’ would be unfair.  To judge 
U.S. actions as correct or necessary though would be equally unthinking.   
The second 100 years of relations between Venezuela and the United States was 
a period replete with missed opportunities and neglect on both sides.  Starting with the 
discovery of oil, U.S.-Venezuelan relations began being built on a stronger foundation of 
mutual economic dependency, yet it was not nearly as strong as one built on mutual trust 
and respect.  Despite the potential for closer ties through the use of soft power and mutual 
support, relations of economic dependency bred fear and continued mistrust. 
America’s ability and opportunities to positively influence through soft power 
political assistance, social reform, or economic aid were neglected in the case of 
Venezuelan.  Additionally, the U.S. continued to vacillate between hard power influence 
and benign neglect.  The U.S. government continued to favor economic stability over 
democratic continuity as an instinctive foreign policy and continued to use its hard power 
influence to achieve its goals.  The United States had a tendency to base its Latin 
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America policy on the “here and now” philosophy.  The U.S. would continue to ignore 
past Venezuelan cooperation, assistance, and support that it had received throughout the 
past century.  The myopic view of the U.S. toward Venezuelan relations has only led to 
bitter feelings and isolation of a country whose cooperation and natural resources the 
U.S. can ill-afford to loose.  
The predominant U.S. methods of achieving influence in Venezuela has been by 
purchasing copious amounts of oil and providing Venezuela with a large source of 
government revenue.  This form of influence by the promise of funds or the threat of 
diminishing funds is categorically hard power.  While this form of hard power influence 
can be imitated by only a very few countries in the world, it has also proven to be much 
less effective than hoped at encouraging effective long-term relations.  Cuba’s increased 
level of influence on a country so much larger in size, population, and GDP begs the 
question: is Washington’s approach the right one?  Just as applicable a question would 
be, is Cuba’s current soft power application trumping the United States’ more traditional 
means of international and hard power global influence?   
Cuba’s ability to assert its own form of soft power influence through co-option of 
the Venezuelan public rather than through coercion is having a greater affect on the 
hearts and minds of the Venezuelan public than most policy makers in Washington would 
care to admit.  According to Venezuelan government sources, President Castro and 
President Chavez are merely working for the combined benefit of the poor.  These poor 
are the ones that have been overlooked by the political elites running the country for 
decades.  According to some American sources, there are Cubans in the Venezuelan 
intelligence agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Department of Military Intelligence, and 
the Central Bank of Venezuela.126  
The truth of what is occurring inside Venezuela and the real reason for Cuba’s 
influence more than likely lies somewhere between what Venezuela and what 
Washington is saying.  The facts of the matter are that Cuba is influencing Venezuela.  
To what extent or for how long the influence will permeate Venezuelan society and 
politics is a matter of debate.  Who is to blame for this apparent failure of democracy in 
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Venezuela – long considered a bastion of democracy?  Is there in fact a failure of 
democracy occurring?  Based on the successful completion of the Venezuelan 
presidential referendum recently held, it would appear that democracy is in fact alive and 
well in Venezuela.  The question is not whether or not democracy will last in Venezuela.  
The question the United States needs to be asking is what the U.S. could have done to 
better ensure its influence in a country it needs on so many different matters.  Venezuela 
is important to the United States in the War on drugs.  Venezuela’s oil is vital to 
America’s economy.  Venezuela is playing a very vocal role in the FTAA negotiations – 
an agreement that many in the Bush administration want.  Lastly, Venezuela’s 
relationship with Cuba is vexing and troubling to so many throughout the current U.S. 
government administration. 
The United States continues to have a large soft power and cultural influence 
throughout the world.  While the message it sends out is not always positive, it is still an 
influence that can be tailored to a certain extent.  There should be little wonder as to the 
existence of such an antagonistic relationship that has developed between the United 
States and Venezuela.  Based on the extensive use of hard power tactics by the U.S. 
throughout the past 182 year history, it is of little wonder as to the lack of any remaining 
influence or credibility maintained by the U.S. in that country at all.  Should the U.S. 
decide to seriously note Cuba’s soft power influence in Venezuela, it should consider 
how its future foreign relations should be altered or tailored to take best advantage of the 
quickly diminishing cultural influence it may have remaining in a country, and a region, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW 
There is a small window of opportunity to help ensure the success and spread of 
democratic ideology throughout Brazil and Venezuela.  The window of opportunity 
where both countries are willing to listen and be influenced is small; and both are quickly 
closing.  The Iraq war, while far from over, is neither new nor as large a distraction as it 
was in early 2003.  Saddam Hussein has been found, China is actively engaged in 
assisting with the North Korean nuclear dilemma, Iran has agreed to suspend its nuclear 
enrichment program, and Palestinians have agreed to elections to replace the newly 
deceased Yasser Arafat.  President Bush has also been reelected by a clear majority of 
Americans and acquired an increase in the Republican Party majority in both Houses of 
Congress.  With the Republican Party more firmly controlling Congress, President Bush 
and his administration have far fewer excuses to  not spend more time looking south and 
offering true cooperation as it was publicly proclaimed and promised during his 
campaign speeches before the 2000 presidential election.  
B. SOFT POWER CORRELATIONS 
In Latin America, there is a current and considerable under-utilization of the 
United States’ soft power potential capability.  The United States government needs to 
better understand and learn to execute soft power as a primary strategy instead of as a 
tactical alternative.  The U.S. government’s use of hard power should be used more 
judiciously and only when necessary.  Information technology permits and facilitates the 
distribution of ideas and information at the speed of light.  The United States must 
harness this potential, and while an imprecise political tool, it is one with greater long-
term strategic potential than all the guided munitions in the current U.S. arsenal.   
Latin America does not present an immediate, clear, or present danger to the 
United States’ national security.  This statement is not to imply however that Latin 
America is neither of any consequence to the United States.  The U.S. has demonstrated 
its support for the theory of pre-emptive war as recently confirmed by Operation IRAQI 
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FREEDOM.  A foreign policy of pre-emptive peace should be given no less 
consideration. 
The significance of pre-emptive peace as a foreign policy is not intended to imply 
that the U.S. should not consider going to war to defend its national security.  On the 
contrary, a government that would not consider going to war in self-defense is a 
government that is limiting itself and failing the country they promised to serve and 
protect.  This is particularly true in the case of the United States.  By virtue of being the 
only superpower in the world, it is often called upon to solve so many of the worlds ills 
via its military might.  However, how old is the adage, ‘An ounce of prevention is worth 
a pound of cure.’?   
1. Brazil Analysis of U.S. Soft Power 
a. 1930s to 1964 
Prior to and during WWII, the U.S. publicly espoused the use of soft 
power and the need to work with Brazil as an equal.  This verbal stance alone won the 
U.S. considerable soft power support in Brazil.  Despite the soft power rhetoric toward 
such a ‘strategically vital country as Brazil’, research indicates that following Brazil’s 
commitment to the Allied Powers and after the defeat of the Axis Powers, the U.S. 
actually increased its use of hard power.  Declassified Top Secret documents mentioned 
how Congress would intentionally hold badly needed loans from Brazil until compliance 
with unrelated issues were resolved.  The U.S. on more than one occasion bypassed 
normal diplomatic protocol and directly funded private corporations in Brazil enabling 
the U.S. to redirect shipments of natural resources destined for other countries and even 
for plants inside Brazil itself. 127   
There were other forms of hard power application directed against Brazil 
by the U.S.  In the early 1950s, the U.S. let Brazilian President Getulio Vargas know how 
pleased it was with Britain following its firm and harsh treatment of the Communist Party 
in British Guyana. Brazil was also informed that financial assistance was directly tied to 
the level of cooperation with the United States.  The logic of using hard power in such a 
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strategically important country as Brazil, after gaining its allegiance, seemed 
unnecessary.  The level of frankness and the hard power extent the U.S. administration 
was willing to go to manipulate ‘friendly allies’ and entire governments for post-war 
policy preferences seemed to actually produce more real harm than potential good.  This 
became evident as Brazil quickly fought to expand its political distance and independence 
from the U.S after Brazil failed to see political support by the hegemon to the north once 
hostilities in Europe had ended.  
The previous examples of U.S. tactics and those mentioned in the earlier 
Chapter II on Brazil, indicate a foreign policy wrought with hard power.  Based on the 
research for this thesis, the tendency of the United States has been to use soft power for 
more tactical objectives rather than for any long term strategically political or 
ideologically significant goals.  Based on the occurrence of a WWII though, it would be 
difficult to insist that the U.S. government at the time give up all clandestine operations 
and risk the loss of such potentially valuable resources.  While the U.S. situation in a 
world war and an ideology war with the U.S.S.R. does not excuse in totality all actions of 
one government against another government that share friendly and mutually beneficial 
relations, it does help explain it.  
While hard power was the predominant policy in place with Brazil during 
the period from the 1930s to 1964, there were definitive examples of soft power.  
Cultural exchanges, Hollywood movies, and direct financial assistance (with no 
contingencies) all played a role in Brazil’s increased support of the U.S. war effort.  Even 
these examples of soft power were however muted by the fact that as early as 1945, the 
United States began decreasing its funding of information programs (a primary source of 
U.S. soft power projection).  The decrease in funding was due to the lack of perceived 
importance of Brazil as a strategic or even tactical ally.  With the foreign policy focus 
shifting to completing the victory and rebuilding Europe, the U.S. lost complete focus of 
the economic and political importance of Brazil.  The funding that remained was intended 
to counter the propaganda that was perceived as just beginning to infiltrate Brazil from 
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the Soviet Union.128  Again, the soft power exercised by the U.S. was based on a tactical 
threat vice strategic ideology.   
Despite the less-than-optimum tactically orientated soft power approach 
by the United States throughout the war, the final outcome can be regarded as successful.  
This success is qualitatively measured strictly by the fact that the Allied Powers won 
WWII.  The U.S. cultural affect in Brazil was a noticeable factor and did help garner 
some badly needed support for the U.S.  While it can be argued that the United States’ 
use of hard power was more excessive than probably necessary, that judgment would be 
based predominantly on a perfect hind-sight perspective.  That the U.S. lost strategic 
advantages by reducing soft power efforts in Brazil is less debatable.  Despite Brazil’s 
cooperation with the U.S. due in large part to the U.S. tactical soft power influence in the 
country, America still managed to end the period with bitter feelings on the part of Brazil. 
b. 1965 to 1991 
The Alliance for Progress initiated by President Kennedy in 1961 may be 
considered an example of U.S. soft power.  This assessment though would be based only 
on a very superficial examination of the program.  The Alliance for Progress program 
continued until 1967.  Despite six years and over $22 billion in loans, grants, and 
matching funds from other countries, the program’s final results were far from 
encouraging or spectacular.129  The program’s noble goals of lifting an entire hemisphere 
out of poverty and transporting it to a state of self rule were not merely lofty, but 
ultimately unrealistic. 130   
Hard power tactics proliferated under the Alliance for Progress banner.  
Hard power initiatives were implemented by the U.S. military, CIA, and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID).   It was the USAID that was designated to be 
primarily responsible for the execution of the program.131  The USAID was neither 
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prepared financially nor logistically to effectively carry out such a Herculean task with 
such unrealistic and unattainable goals. 
By 1967, after the Alliance for Progress had been in place for five years, 
nine military coups had occurred displacing constitutional and civilian governments.132  
The largest shortcoming of the program and its eventual demise was demonstrated by the 
contradictory policies it put into action.  Despite its publicly touted goals of economic 
growth, democracy, equality, education, health, and development,133 there was an 
additional section of the plan that was not publicized.  That section discussed the use of 
the program for countering the Cuban revolution and defense against communism.134 The 
plan all but gave the CIA and other governmental agencies the needed authorization to 
conduct operations ‘as necessary’ to ensure the successful implementation of the Alliance 
for Progress as they saw fit.   Despite President Kennedy’s public policy for fairness and 
equality for all people in the hemisphere, even he was not above using the CIA or 
opposed to covert operations when he could be convinced as to its benefits.135   
During this period of Cold War tensions, there was a particular concern 
and dilemma.  The thought process of the presidential administration at the time was that 
by insisting on democracy in any of the Latin America countries, the U.S. administration 
risked alienating those country’s authoritarian leaders and thereby pushing them and their 
countries into the ideological camps of the U.S.S.R.  This fear was precisely expressed 
when President Kennedy was quoted as saying, “There are three possibilities in 
descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the 
Trujillo regime (Dominican Republic), or a Castro regime.  We ought to aim at the first, 
but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third.”136  
Despite Kennedy’s own intent for the Alliance for Progress, the reality he faced forced 
him to modify his own diplomatic masterwork.  
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Land reform in Latin America, one of the largest factors in contributing to 
inequality, gave way as a goal in the Alliance for Progress in favor of defending the U.S. 
interests against communism.  Despite the lofty intent of the Alliance, it succumbed to its 
own weight and size.  By the very nature of its immensity in scope, the lack of directional 
supervision and leadership allowed the program to loose focus.  The multiple groups 
attempting to gain access to the billions of dollars allocated for the program, both in the 
U.S. and Latin America inevitably diluted its effectiveness.  Most the organizations’ 
involved attempted to implement the program based on individual objectives thereby 
creating redundancy and ambiguity.  In many cases, this created more harm than good 
both politically and in the initial aspirations of the program.  Of course part of the 
problem entailed entities in Latin America that did not necessarily want the Alliance for 
Progress to even succeed.  There were those in Latin America that saw the program as 
threat and would loose influence and power if it actually succeeded.  The Alliance for 
Progress having started as a soft power approach and intent, culminated as a tool for hard 
power methodology by many of the very players that were suppose to be implementing it.   
During this same time period, the United States was supplying Brazil and 
its military dictatorship a record amount of economic aid.  The amount of economic and 
military aid to Brazil alone increased from just over $500 million during 1946 to 1955, to 
over $3.2 billion between 1956 and 1976.137  This hard power increase in financial 
assistance from the U.S. ‘bought’ short term cooperation from the military elite ruling 
Brazil at the time.  As stated earlier in the thesis, this method of hard power did not 
provide any long term benefits or influence.  The hard power economic and military 
assistance from the U.S. was used for tactical persuasion in Brazil and provided nothing 
in the way of future support from the general population.  No thought was given by the 
U.S. administration as to the long-term consequences of its hard power policy once the 
military dictatorship ended and civilians reestablished democratic rule. 
The remainder of the period was a series of increases and decreases in 
financial and politic support for Brazil.  U.S. foreign policies changed so often that it left 
Brazilian leaders (as well as the rest of Latin America for that matter) completely 
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confused as to what the U.S. administration really wanted or expected.  A lot of the 
policies that were in place during the Kennedy administration were changed when the 
Johnson administration came in.  President Johnson adopted a policy of accepting 
governments and regime-types in whatever form or manner they came to power.  
President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger’s policy became one of general benign neglect.  Latin 
Americans finally thought they were able to distinguish a policy pattern from the United 
States.   
When President Carter was elected in 1976 and the United States foreign 
policy took another sharp turn, Latin America was again taken by surprise.  The focus of 
the Carter administration was principally human rights.  President Carter’s tactics were 
predominantly hard power economic sanctions against any country that had extensive 
human rights abuses.  Brazil quickly became a target of the United States’ new focus.  
Prior to the U.S. threatening to withhold military aid though, Brazil executed a surprising 
preemptive political maneuver.  Despite the real potential for severe U.S. hard power 
consequences, Brazil pulled out of the United States’ Military Assistance Program, which 
it had participated in since the 1950s.  Even though Brazil did not want to severe all ties 
with the U.S., it was obviously not afraid to demonstrate its independence.   
President Carter’s use of hard power through economic sanctions forced a 
division between the U.S. government and many of the authoritarian leaders in Latin 
America.  The Carter administration’s human rights policies had an additional and 
unexpected result.  By rigidly enforcing hard power economic sanctions against 
authoritative regimes, President Carter concurrently planted contradicting impressions of 
the U.S. onto the leadership in the oppressive regimes and upon a generation of those 
being oppressed and imprisoned in Brazil.  The repressive leadership saw U.S. policy as a 
blatant use of offending hard power tactics.  Those being oppressed by the regimes saw 
America’s human rights policy enforcement as soft power influence, giving them an 
appreciation and admiration for the U.S.  Twenty years later when the persecuted 
generation came to power, it remembered the emphasis of human rights pursued by the 
United States.  The favorable soft power influenced developed by the U.S. in those 
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oppressed in the 1970s actually allowed the United States to enjoy an increase in support 
from Brazil in the UN during the 1990s.138  
In 1980 when President Reagan won the White House, the right wing 
military dictators were again in the favor with the United States’ government.  It is 
commonly known that the Reagan administration used hard power to garner cooperation 
in whatever form the White House needed at the time.  An example of this hard power 
would be the CIA’s mining of Nicaragua’s harbors in 1984.  With President Reagan’s 
main focus on Central America, he attempted to enlist the aid of South America (to 
include specifically Brazil) to provide support for his crusades.  The hard power used 
extensively and liberally during this period though was ineffectual in garnering firm 
support for the United States in the region.139     
Interestingly, it was during the early 1980s when the third wave of 
democracy began to be felt in Latin America.  Since the Reagan administration had only 
been in place for barely a year and its support for authoritarian regimes in the region is 
well documented, any inference to his administration or his polices being remotely 
responsible for the break out of democracy in the region would be doubtful at best.  By 
the early eighties, Brazil had already started its shift from military dictatorship to civilian 
rule, so this new policy was not a defining factor in returning democracy to Brazil either.   
It would be equally challenging to provide concrete evidence proving that the Carter 
administration and its human rights efforts were directly responsible for the democratic 
wave in Latin America.  Based on timing and the popularity of President Carter’s stance 
on human rights however, it is a more credible assertion that Carter’s hard power tactics 
at curbing abuses in Latin America (that produced soft power influence) were more 
responsible for the eventual push toward democracy than President Reagan’s hard power 
tactics of supporting dictatorial regimes.  It would seem that despite the intentions or 
claims of the U.S. government, its political influence and use of hard power as a reason 
for the regional shift toward democracy was far less a factor than they would have 
everyone believe. 
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c. 1992 to 2004 
There are many different factors to consider during this period of Brazilian 
and American relations.  In the last nine years, U.S military and economic aid have 
increased; military aid increasing at a faster rate.140 The USAID Freedom Rating for 
Brazil is currently at the same level as during its military dictatorship in 1981.  The 
percentage of Brazilians that believe democracy is a preferable form of government has 
decreased from 50% in 1996 to 37% in 2004.141  These statistics do not demonstrate 
resounding support for democracy from Brazil, the largest and most economically 
powerful country in Latin America.  The numbers are even more dismal in reference to 
the nearly $200 million the United States, the world’s most powerful democracy, has 
provided for Brazil in economic and military assistance since as recently as 1996.142  
A question must be asked.  In what areas does the U.S. carry influence 
within Brazil?  More specifically, can the U.S provide a more favorable view of itself and 
therefore democracy in general?  In direct reference to these questions comes the concern 
over the FTAA negotiations.  Currently, the largest obstacle between the U.S. and Brazil 
in these FTAA negotiations is the farm subsidies that the U.S. provides to its farmers.  
The subsidies allow U.S. producers to sell goods overseas at a much reduced rate than 
would be possible if produced and sold in Brazil.  This has the affect of forcing many 
Brazilian farmers out of business due to Brazilian farmer’s inability to compete.  The 
WTO has ruled against the U.S. with its steel tariffs, cotton subsidies, and most recently, 
the United States’ Byrd Amendment.143  On all the above mentioned legal actions against 
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the United States, Brazil has either been one of the action members or the actual initiator 
against the U.S.144  It appears as if all the hard power used by the U.S. and the millions of 
dollars in economic and military assistance since WWII have not provided the long-term 
influence needed by the U.S. to secure Brazil’s cooperation. 
2. Analysis of Soft Power Application in Venezuela  
a. A. General History 
Despite a long history between the United States and Venezuela, there are 
specific examples of the United States abandoning Venezuelan democracy.  It should be 
no surprise that Venezuela failed to support the U.S. led invasion upon one of the 
proclaimed axis’s of evil - Iraq.  That fact is especially poignant given that Venezuela 
was once referenced as one of Latin America’s Axis of Evils, along with Cuba and 
Colombia’s narcoterrorists.145  It may appear as a stretch to many Americans to consider 
the possibility that the United States would ever contemplate invading Venezuela.  To the 
local population, it is perfectly logical to assume that the U.S. would consider invading 
any member of OPEC (Iraq being the precedent) or any oil-rich nation if there was a 
threat to one of its vital oil resources.  It was even implied by Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger that the U.S. would be willing to use force to seize oil fields if the United 
States’ national security was at stake.146  All these are hard power tactics aimed at 
influencing Venezuela to comply with the U.S. line of thought through coercion.   
After the April 12, 2002 military coup that temporarily removed President 
Chavez from office, the U.S. took uncharacteristically quick action.  Unfortunately, 
instead of condemning the removal of the country’s democratically elected leader, the 
U.S. chose to recognize the military junta’s selection of business leader Pedro Carmon as 
the presidential replacement.  The quick acknowledgement by the U.S. administration of 
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the militarily picked leader in the 2002 coup and the U.S. administration blaming 
President Chavez for the coup itself did not engender positive relations between the U.S. 
and Venezuela.147  General U.S. policy in Venezuela has not lent itself to long-term 
understanding and support of United States positions. 
Despite America’s lack of support for President Chavez, Venezuela has 
posted some interesting numbers concerning its views on democracy.  Since 1996, the 
percentage of Venezuelans that believe democracy is the best form of government 
increased from 60% in 1996 to 73% in 2004.148  An increase in the Venezuelan belief of 
democracy while the U.S. considers Venezuelan democracy to be diminishing is 
interesting.  Even more interesting is that this increase is contrasted to a marked decrease 
in Venezuela’s political and civil liberty freedoms tracked since 1977 by Freedom House 
International.149  U.S. influence in Venezuela has conversely decreased during the same 
period.  While a direct correlation can not be corroborated without greater analysis, it 
provides interesting data to consider in further research. 
The United States government has failed to realize and fully appreciate 
Venezuela’s general propensity for democratic political stability (relative to the region).  
Whether the last 40 years of democracy during the alternating governments of the 
Democratic Action Party (AD) and the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) was 
representative of true democracy in practice or just a shared oligopoly is debatable.  
Despite this, Venezuela has proven itself as a country that while not always adhering to 
the letter of the law, has attempted to embrace the spirit of its democratic constitution.  It 
appears at least that in this regard, the citizen’s of Venezuela and the United States share 
a similar feeling: democracy, though approached differently and flawed in many ways, is 
a system worth fighting for.   
The misuse of hard power by the U.S. and Venezuela has demonstrated an 
important link between these two countries.  Despite the rhetoric, the dialogue has not 
been nearly as important as the flow of oil and money.  This is significant in two regards.  
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First, Venezuela is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the United States, supplying 
approximately 13% of the U.S. annual supply.150  Oil revenues produce nearly 50% of 
the Venezuelan government’s proceeds.  In all the contradicting statistics by Freedom 
House, USAID, or Latinobarometro polls concerning the degradation of democracy in 
Venezuela, neither Venezuela nor the U.S. has discontinued the economic relationship or 
reliance on each other’s money and oil respectively.  The second point is that political 
relations have not been discontinued despite the Bush administration’s recognition of the 
military junta’s presidential figurehead or President Chavez visiting Fidel Castro and 
Saddam Hussein.  The United States’ need for Venezuela’s oil and Venezuela’s need for 
America’s money is taking priority over most other international issues.  
Cuba 
Another factor in U.S. – Venezuelan relations is the Cuban influence in 
Venezuela.  Cuba has started to exert an increased amount of soft power influence in 
Venezuela.  By providing over 10,000 of doctors, health workers, advisors, and teachers, 
Cuba has been given near-carte blanche to Venezuela’s military, intelligence, and 
intellectual infrastructure.151  Conversely, President Chavez has been using anti-
American sentiment as a political tool elevating himself on the back of American 
political contradictions and the United States’ propensity for unilateralism in its military 
and political objectives.152  
Venezuela and Cuba shared an extremely antagonistic history as pointed 
out earlier in this analysis.  Despite the two country’s antagonistic history, Cuba’s recent 
soft power application has given it a greater role in Venezuelan politics than that of the 
United States’.  Regardless the United States’ economic, military, and cultural hard 
power might, it appears defenseless in stopping Venezuela from visiting Cuba, Iraq, and 
Libya.  Even with the U.S. hard power tactics of providing over a million dollars to NED 
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(which financially supported the Chavez opposition), President Chavez still won the 
presidential referendum in August 2004.   
The U.S. is not just losing influence in Venezuela; it is being set back by 
at least a generation.  Cuban teachers are setting the educational agenda and curriculum 
for Venezuelan children.  Cuban doctors are living in the poorest sections of Venezuelan 
cities attending to the very sick and more importantly, the very young and influential.  
Cuban ‘advisors’ are also working with the Venezuelan military and intelligence 
departments.  U.S. military advisors are being kicked out of specific and long-occupied 
offices and bases in Venezuela.153  U.S.–Venezuelan military exercises are being 
cancelled and U.S. privileges in the war on drugs and terrorism such as over-flight 
authority is being curtailed.  In twenty years there will be a generation of Venezuelan’s 
who will have been raised under an anti-American atmosphere and influenced by anti-
American Cuban teachers, doctors, and advisors.  These Venezuelans will be in power 
controlling their nation’s oil supply, making decisions on their countries drug policies, 
trade policies, and making international agreements with countries such as Brazil, Libya, 
Iraq, and China.   
The U.S. alienated Lt. Col. Hugo Chavez as a coup leader in 1992, as a 
presidential candidate in 1998, and as a president in 2002.  The U.S. was justified in 
alienating a coup leader and perhaps justified in being cautious concerning Chavez as a 
‘candidate’.  The U.S. fell short though in failing to support him as a democratically 
elected president.  While the U.S. did not perhaps push Chavez to Cuba, it certainly gave 
him no reason to consider the United States as a viable alternative.  The U.S. application 
of hard power in Venezuela has proven to be of no long-term effectiveness and has 
actually proven to be a source of anti-Americanism that has only aided those opposed to 
America’s perceived hegemony.  Tracing the effectiveness of Cuba’s soft power 
application only further demonstrates that despite the United States’ military and 
economic superiority, it may be Cuba’s soft power that is proving a much more effective 
method of influence. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Along with a historical propensity for vacillating foreign policy, the United States 
has a tendency for attempting one-size fits-all solutions: the Washington Consensus154  is 
a perfect example of this.  The following recommendations should not be viewed as 
simply “The” plan or approach to all the countries in Latin America.  No plan should be 
executed until the very specific idiosyncrasies and problems and uniqueness of the 
situation is thoroughly analyzed and all options considered.  One-size-fits-all may be 
acceptable in reference to certain fashion accessories, but not for an international 
approach to U.S. foreign policy in the promotion of American democratic ideals in 
countries as varied as those represented by Brazil and Venezuela.   
1. Soft Power Old & New 
There were many tactics that the United States employed to boost its soft power 
cultural influence.  Regrettably, the U.S. disarmed itself of some of its most effective soft 
power means years ago in lieu of hard power implementation.  The United States has 
proven itself very capable of producing quick hard power results.  For examples of this, 
the reader need only reference past U.S. policy efforts with Dollar Diplomacy, Gunboat 
Diplomacy, U.S. Marines in Nicaragua, and the Cuban Embargo to re-familiarize oneself 
with less than successful hard power politics of the United States.  
Some of the more successful soft power tools used by the United States in the past 
have been Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and the CIA sponsored 
Congress for Cultural Freedom.  The United States Information Agency (USIA)155 and 
the Arab Service Section of Voice of America were abolished despite their effectiveness 
and should be reconstituted for implementation in Latin America.   
 
                                                 
154 The term “Washington Consensus” was originally coined in 1990 by an economist by the name of 
John Williamson.  The phrase has come to be used interchangeably with terms such as “neoliberalism” and 
“globalization”.  Some of the policies proposed by the Washington Consensus were: fiscal discipline, tax 
reform, trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and the securing of property rights.  Based more on 
the execution of the plan rather than the idea, the term itself has become a lightening rod for ant-
globalizers, trade negotiators, and many developing country politicians.  For more information on the 
Washington Consensus, see: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html last visited on 
November 16, 2004. 
155 The USIA was absorbed into the U.S. Department of State in 1999. 
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2. National Endowment for Democracy  
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) needs some reconsideration and 
adjustments based on two specific concerns.  NED’s first concern is based on the reduced 
funding which barely allows it to continue to operate, much less operate successfully.156  
Secondly, NED’s neutrality in Venezuela is in jeopardy based on how direct recipients of 
NED funds were put into positions of governmental power during the two day coup that 
removed President Chavez from office in April 2002.  NED provides a very useful 
purpose in many countries, to include Venezuela.  However, if the U.S. is going to fund 
an organization, it is incumbent on the government to ensure those funds are used for the 
purpose intended.   
3. Supra-National Organizations 
The United States must actively engage and involve the supra-national 
organizations in any affair larger than a bilateral agreement.  Some of these associations 
are the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), NATO, the 
United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and even the World Health 
Organization (WHO).  The U.S should not engage these organizations merely for the 
purpose of providing an increased air of legitimacy.  This author is not recommending 
that the United States forfeit its sovereignty or right of self-defense for the sake of 
winning a popularity contest.  Nor should the United States submit its national defense 
policies and plans to a ‘global test’ to ascertain its viability in the opinion pages of the 
world press.  The United States should however, be cognizant of world opinion and take 
appropriate steps to counter anticipated negative publicity and be able to explain its 
actions as necessary or appropriate.  This is not recommended for justification of its 
actions, but to better establish a consensus and improve the odds of international support 
as necessary for the conflict or issue.   
4. U.S. and OAS   
Despite 50 years of predominately hard power application and near-total 
hegemony in the region, the United States does not maintain dominant control even 
within its own self-proclaimed sphere of influence.  The United States’ influence in a 
                                                 
156 Kampelman, pp 624. 
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relatively minor supra-national organization such as the OAS is far from complete.  In the 
30 cases that have involved the Rio Treaty, the OAS, or Resolution-1080,157 only six 
times did the United States unconditionally get its way without having to compromise 
with any of the other countries.  Of those six times, three dealt specifically with Cuba and 
one was a unilateral action against the organization when the U.S. chose to go into 
Panama to remove President Noriega for drug trafficking.158   
The United States must engage the OAS any and every time it needs to take 
action in Latin America.  Involving the OAS not only provides legitimacy and increases 
dialog among all members, but provides greater communication and support for the OAS 
thereby increasing strength to an organization whose very charter currently supports the 
consolidation of democracies.  
5. The Internet Conundrum and 10 Other Options 
The internet, while incredibly powerful and instantaneous, is not the panacea that 
some would like to think.  In 1998, 100 million people used the Internet.  Some experts 
even predict that by the end of 2005, that number will increase to one billion people.  
Even if that is true, that ignores over five billion people who will not have access.  In 
fact, three-quarters of the world’s population does not own a phone, much less a modem 
and computer.159  While the number of internet cafes and public libraries with internet 
access are growing in number, the internet is still not as ubiquitous as some believe.  So, 
while the Internet should be utilized to the maximum extent possible, the U.S. needs to 
ensure that it dose not become ‘Plan-A.’ 
Listed below are 10 soft power related possibilities that the United States should 
consider to cultivate a better image of itself in Latin America.  By increasing its efforts to 
spread western ideals through appropriate soft power methods, the United States could 
reclaim the cultural revolution that it once professed before the U.S. became too 
important to bother with programs that encouraged ‘direct marketing’ of American ideals 
person-to-person. 
                                                 
157 Resolution-1080 is a regional security agreement signed during the Santiago Declaration in 1991. 
158 Shaw, C. M. (2003, Fall). Limits to Hegemonic Influence on the Organization of American States. 
Latin America Politics and Science, 45, 3, 59. 
159 Keohane and Nye, pp 81. 
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1) Reopening of American Centers. During WWII, American Centers were situated 
in most of the major cities in Europe.  These should be reopened near U.S. 
Embassies (NOT in them) throughout Latin America.  The American Centers 
should go beyond the expected and anticipated propaganda and provide an actual 
area and resources for which people can view different ideas, culture, and better 
appreciate what the democratic and free-world has to offer.  The best way to 
positively influence a culture in favoring a specific ideology would be by not 
being afraid to show other ideas and options.  By better insuring and supplying 
well-rounded sources of information, the U.S. also reduces the chance of these 
centers being vandalized or targeted by anti-American groups.  If these centers are 
attacked, then the appropriate U.S. agency(s) should be prepared with media files 
to accentuate the diversity of the information denied locals and how the 
perpetrators are damaging the local community, not the U.S.  There is an 
incredible amount of soft power strength in demonstrating open-mindedness and a 
lack of fear of other ideas and options.    
2) Assist Brazil and Venezuela in land reform.  This issue is one of the major 
contributing factors for both, slowed growth and wealth inequality.  Through land 
reform and the judicial processes ensuring fairness and equality, the U.S. could 
provide a major supporting role. Success for Brazil on this front may allow the 
opportunity for the U.S. to garner success in other areas such as the FTAA.  In 
that same venue, Venezuela also suffers from land ownership inequality – though 
not to the same extent as Brazil.  By assisting Venezuela and Brazil logistically, 
judicially, legally, and even financially (to only a certain extent), the U.S. would 
not only help provide stability among the 47% of the population below the 
poverty line in Venezuela, 160 but would be building the foundation for a 
generations worth of support through soft power influence. 
3) Extend, encourage, and support existing foreign exchange programs: agriculture, 
economic, political, and cultural (arts, music, dance, etc…).  Not just talk about, 
but demonstrate to Brazilian and Venezuelan nationals what the United States is 
truly about rather than what they may simply get from their television sets 
                                                 
160 CIA – The World Factbook.  Retrieved from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ve.html#Econ, last accessed December 12, 2004. 
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watching such globally popular shows as Dallas or Baywatch.  Exchange 
programs increases the person-to-person contact that proves so much more 
successful than what may be garnered of U.S. cable networks.161 
4) Improve access for foreign exchange students to American institutions.  This type 
of exchange program (with the appropriate screening procedures as per the “9/11 
Commission”) would allow more Latin Americans to get an American education 
in both the academic as well as the ideological sense.  The goal would not be 
indoctrination of foreign students, but cooption through familiarization. More 
effective and efficient procedures for screening can be put in place that should 
allow for increased enrollment without sacrificing security.  This is being 
implemented at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA.  NPS is 
expecting to increase enrollment of International officers by at least 30% over the 
next couple of years.162  If the Department of defense is able to recognize the 
importance of Educational exchange experience, then the State Department 
should also be made aware of its importance.  
5) Institute increased U.S. Cross-Cultural Education and understanding for 
Americans.  Improved education would apply to both U.S. government as well as 
military representatives assigned to Latin American positions.  By enhancing 
cultural training, United States representatives such as Foreign Service Officers, 
governmental delegates, and even military envoys would be able to put a better 
face on a U.S. culture more receptive and appreciative of a Latin American 
country’s unique history, culture, and language.  Additionally, better staffing of 
embassy and political offices would provide better services to all customers, not 
just American customers in a foreign country.  The adage of doing more with less 
should not apply to the American mission; whether that mission is in Iraq or in 
reference to properly staffing American Diplomatic offices representing the 
United States and serving the world.  
                                                 
161 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. What The World Thinks In 2002-How Global 
Publics View: Their Lives, Countries, The World, and America. Washington, D.C.: The Pew Global 
Attitudes, 55-56.  Retrieved from www.people-press.org, last accessed December 15, 2004.  
162 The increase in enrollment of international students was a topic of discussion in an NPS Marketing 
class (GB3030) on December 9, 2004. 
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6) Revitalize American youth involvement abroad.163  The United States should 
revitalize programs such as its Points of Light program established by President 
H.W. Bush, Ameri-Core established by President Clinton, the Peace Corps, and 
of course military enlistment.  These programs would provide insight into the 
positive ideals of Americanism at the grass roots level with no hidden agenda 
other than to aid another country (more applicable through the Peace Corps and 
Ameri-Core than the military).  This could be the most effective form of soft 
power available to the United States next to its fashion, movies, and television 
programming.  Again, nothing is as effective as person-to-person communication, 
contact, and assistance. 
7) Encourage NGO’s to provide aid, assistance, and education.  NGOs have 
mushroomed in numbers and capacity within the last several years alone.  Their 
ability to reach into a culture has become very effective.  Through the appropriate 
amount of cooperation between the State Department and NGO’s, the number of 
people that can be reached and the potential positive effect directly into the 
culture is immense.  It must be caution that the potential for fraud and abuse 
inside NGOs also exists.  A definitive amount of oversight would be required to 
ensure minimum waste of funds as well as ensuring that the specified NGOs 
stayed on message and intent. 
8) Provide direct assistance to increase Education in targeted countries.  Investment 
of human resources is some of the best long-term investments that a developing 
country can make.  The United States needs to target some of its assistance 
directly at this goal to assist and encourage countries to make that commitment to 
its own future.  In fact, it is this very program that has many administrators in the 
White House so concerned about Venezuela.  Cuba is assisting Venezuela with 
the very thing that the U.S. recommends all countries attempt to do – increase 
provided education.  The fact that it is Cuba in Venezuela and not the U.S. is a 
concern for which the U.S. can only blame itself.   
                                                 
163 Finn, pp17. 
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9) Increase Coordination among U.S agencies in an attempt to improve the efficacy 
of all programs.  The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 164 attempts to do 
this by its own regulations.  However, the MCA disqualifies most Latin American 
countries from its programs.  This disqualification is due to the minimum 
requirements to be a fund recipient and how most Latin American countries are 
not quite destitute enough to meet these requirements.  As a result, only Haiti, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras have qualified as recipients for any funds from the 
MCA in the last year.165  The United States can either choose to help Latin 
America onto the side of increasing prosperity or continue to ignore the majority 
of its own hemisphere and allow it to slide back into another ‘lost decade’ as it 
continues its left shift into authoritarian democracies. 
10) Reduce the large subsidies currently in place for U.S. farmers and allow greater 
market access in the U.S.  The U.S. needs to reduce the current level of farm 
subsidies given to the U.S agricultural sector by a few billion dollars.  Since 1995, 
the U.S. government has provided U.S. farmers with over $16 billion annually in 
farm subsidies. Of that $16 billion, over $10 billion a year goes toward U.S. 
growers that compete directly with Brazilian farmers. 166  These figures do not 
take into account steal and other non-agricultural sectors in which the U.S. and 
Brazil directly compete against one another.  This author is acutely aware of the 
political difficulty in any attempted execution of decreasing subsidies by a U.S. 
administration.  However, with the current political situation being enjoyed by the 
GOP controlling the House, the Senate, the Executive branch, having won the 
American heartland, and the moral right, there would not be a better time to set in 
motion such a badly needed correction.  The United States would have more to 
gain nationally from improved relations and a better trade agreement with a Latin 
American country of almost 200 million people than with an additional subsidy 
increase to any one specific U.S. agricultural sector.  The increased trade would 
                                                 
164 http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html, last accessed November 
29, 2004.  
165 http://www.mca.gov/, last accessed November 30, 2004. 
166 Environmental Working Group.  Farm Subsidy Database.  
http://www.ewg.org/farm/region.php?fips=00000, last accessed December 8, 2004. 
75 
also be more beneficial in the long-term for both countries.  Perpetuation of farm 
subsidies allows American farmers to remain relatively insulated from global 
competition.  The subsidies received removes many of the incentives for U.S. 
farmers have to improve competitively and it further removes incentives to 
develop more effective and efficient ways of producing.  U.S. subsidies prevent 
the very efficacy that the U.S. attempts to force many Latin America countries to 
do through the Washington Consensus.  Through greater market access, Brazil 
and Venezuela (as well as the rest of Latin America) would be able to increase its 
own government income.  Increased government income would allow the 
countries to better repay foreign debt.  In turn, increased government revenue 
would allow the countries more freedom to funnel money toward investing in the 
infrastructure of the country and in human capital without having to borrow as 
much from global institutions.  Additionally, more goods at a cheaper price would 
be available to the average American consumer.167   
D. THE 10-OPTION SUMMATION 
Some of the biggest concerns that the United States has with Brazil and 
Venezuela are when they attempt to act as the United States did almost 100 years ago.  
These two large and influential countries are demanding special privileges, recognition, 
and autonomy.  They are expecting to be consulted in all international matters that 
reference or effect their sphere of influence - all of which the United States bellowed 
toward Europe with the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine 100 years ago.   
The United States needs to understand that democracy (whatever the form it may 
take or by whatever definition the reader may chose) does NOT come with a guarantee.  
Democracy is not something you can buy and have delivered in a pre-packaged container 
with a warranty stating that ‘it will comply with U.S. doctrine and wishes’.  True 
democracy  is  a  double  edged  sword.   On  the  one  side, it  allows  a  country to make  
                                                 
167 This program does not even take into account the corollary benefits Brazil and Venezuela would 
receive from encouraging their agricultural sectors to revitalize themselves. 
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‘collective’ decisions on what is best for that country.  The other side of the issue is the 
understanding that the path chosen by a specific democracy my not directly coincide with 
the wishes of the United States.   
The U.S. has been predominantly concerned with what is best for the U.S.  That 
does not make it evil or vile.  It makes the U.S. normal in the political process that its 
government makes in reference to foreign and domestic policy decisions.  It does make 
the United States normal in its attempts to take care of its people and the constituents of 
its politicians.  Unfortunately, history is wrought with ‘normal’ national leaders making 
decisions for their countries to the detriment of all others. 
If the U.S. wants to demonstrate a ‘passionate conservative’ tendency, then it 
needs to make decisions that are in the region’s best interest, not just the best interest of 
the people of one country.  If attempting to do what is best for a region were truly the 
intent of the U.S., then the U.S. would not have interfered with agrarian reforms in 
Guatemala in the 1950’s  or in Brazil in the early 1960’s.  The United States should 
discontinue its policy of benign neglect in countries such as Brazil and Venezuela.  The 
sad fact of the matter is that the United States has done very little to help the outside 
world better understand Americans, the United States, and its culture.   
The U.S. government has been predominantly hands off in the exportation of U.S. 
culture for the last half century.  The government has left cultural exportation to the 
“wisdom” of Hollywood executives and corporations such as Nike®, Coca-Cola®, and 
McDonald’s®.  Based on the over-whelming anti-Americanism spreading across the 
globe, perhaps the U.S. government should pay closer attention to the messages being 
exported and more importantly listen to the responses to those messages.  Do American’s 
want the world to think they are strictly Baywatch, McDonalds®, and Britney Spears, or 
in contrast, Disney®, CNN®, and Microsoft®?  This paper does not support the U.S. 
government regulating the media industry.  Perhaps though, a better understanding and 
appreciation for the impact the U.S. culture has on the world, much less Latin America, 





We seek not just neighbors, but strong partners.  We seek not just 
progress, but shared prosperity.  With persistence and courage, we shaped 
the last century into an American century.  With leadership and 
commitment, this can be the centuries of the Americas….Should I become 
President, I will look south, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental 
commitment to my presidency.168 
Gov. George W. Bush (R-TX) 
The above statement was obviously given before the attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York and the Pentagon.  Since “9/11” Latin America has once again taken 
a back seat on the United States’ agenda as it has for over 100 years.  The U.S. 
presidential administration needs to reconsider its approach toward Latin America and in 
particular Brazil and Venezuela.  The U.S. also needs to work on being more pro-active 
rather than reactive in reference to Latin American political and foreign policy issues.  
This author does not profess to be intimately familiar with all the programs and initiatives 
in reference to the development and improvements in Latin America.  What this author is 
able to state based on exhaustive research, is that the efficacy and coordination of these 
many programs have failed to reach the publicly stated goal of achieving stable 
democracies in Latin America.   
Latin America is not the United States’ backyard, but its neighbor.  The U.S. 
needs to spend more time cooperating with Latin America or ruthlessly discover that 
other countries may join Brazil and Venezuela in their present march to the political left 
(or more ‘populist’ leanings169).  The political left tendency being experienced in Latin 
America could indicate the start of a faster development towards radical populism170 or 
even worse, another reverse wave of democracy.171  As Brazil continues to develop 
                                                 
168 Johnson, G. (2000, August 26).  Bush Stresses Latin America as U.S. Priority, Pushing ‘Special 
Relationship’ with Mexico.  Boston Globe, A1. 
169 As discussed in NS-4510, “Seminar in Latin American Governments and Politics” with DR. 
Harold Trinkunas, December 08, 2003. 
170 Hill, pp 1. 
171 “Reverse Wave” is in reference to Samuel Huntington’s 1992 well published theory of global 
waves of democracy; the “Third Wave” beginning with the democratization in Spain, collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and the systematic replacement of military and authoritarian regimes in Latin America by 
democratically elected leaders.    
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industrially and economically, it is finding itself able to negotiate more effectively with a 
wider assortment of international players who are more than willing to offer assistance.  
International assistance, cooperation, or influence toward Brazil and Venezuela may 
come from the EU, China, Cuba, and perhaps unwittingly, Al Qaeda.  What the United 
States can do is choose whether it is going to sincerely cooperate with its neighbors to the 
south.  What the United States cannot afford to do is to loose its ability to influence who 
these neighbors turn to if the U.S. decides it is again too busy or too pre-occupied to 
listen to its neighbors to the south.   
Venezuela’s President is teetering between democracy and dictatorship.  What has 
the United States done to help a country upon who it has become reliant; not just in 
economic cooperation, but as a major oil supplier?  While divesting the United States’ 
heavy oil interests in Venezuela makes sense for Americans, it fails to answer the original 
question.  Brazil is increasingly exercising regional influence and no longer with the 
United States’ interests in mind.  President Chavez in Venezuela has shown his ability to 
survive and even prosper despite Washington’s apparent disdain for this national leader.  
In fact, the United States’ dislike of President Hugo Chavez only makes him more 
popular in the entire region. 
Two thousand years ago, by the very nature of its soft power cultural influence, 
the Roman Empire was able to spread its customs, philosophies, laws, arts, and traditions 
throughout the known world.  The United States should attempt this same feat 
concentrating on the good of democracy and human rights.  It needs to do this through 
cooption rather than coercion.  President Bush has been re-elected and must now act 
immediately to initiate these programs to maximize the United States’ cultural soft 
power.  The current administration needs to spread the ideas, culture, and beliefs of the 
largest, most powerful country in the world.  If President Bush does not act now, in four 
years the next President pre-occupied with winning a second term in office certainly will 
not and eight years will be lost in achieving these essential reforms.  If this becomes the 
case, then the United States will merely continue down the same path as so many other 
crumbled world empires throughout history, and despite the United States’ potential to 
achieve greatness and be a large part of world history, it risks regulating itself to being 
only a mere footnote.   
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